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INTRODUCTION
An unusual thing is happening in the world of punishment.
Different forms of punishment are starting to appear that chal-
lenge conventional notions of what punishment is all about.
In colonial America, the fledgling state had a rich array of af-
flictions it could draw upon to punish criminal offenders.' Death
was one. Offenders would be publicly dispatched amid great
ceremony, which was sometimes sober and somber, and some-
times not. Whipping, too, was an option, again usually in full dis-
play before an onlooking public.2 Fines were widely used,' as at
times were stocks, pillories, bilboes, branks, brands, ducking
stools, and, on very rare occasions, burning.4 Missing, because it
t Associate Professor, Cornell Law School BA, Colgate University, 1987; M.Phil.,
Oxford University, 1989; J.D., Yale University, 1992. Thanks to Kathy Abrams, Calurn
Carmichael, Steven Clymer, Cynthia Farina, Robert Green, George Hay, Sheri Johnson,
Dan Kahan, Lily Kahng, Toni Massaro, Russell Osgood, Eric Posner, Steve Shiffrin, Gary
Simson, participants at Cornell Law School's faculty workshop, and students in my crimi-
nal law seminar for their helpful comments. Thanks also to Carolyn Lee for outstanding
research assistance.
' See, for example, Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American His-
tory 41-44 (Basic Books 1993). For additional descriptions of colonial punishment, see Mi-
chael Stephen Hindus, Prison and Plantation: Crime, Justice, and Authority in Massachu-
setts and South Carolina, 1767-1878 99-124 (North Carolina 1980); Edwin Powers, Crime
and Punishment in Early Massachusetts, 1620-1692 195-211 (Beacon 1966); Raphael
Semmes, Crime and Punishment in Early Maryland 38-40 (Patterson Smith 1970); Donna
J. Spindel, Crime and Society in North Carolina, 1663-1776 116-37 (Louisiana State
1989).
2 See, for example, Friedman, Crime and Punishment at 37 ("Whipping was an ex-
tremely common punishment throughout the colonies, especially for servants and
slaves.").
' In fact, fines-not shaming penalties-were the "drudge-horse" of colonial justice.
Friedman, Crime and Punishment at 38. See also Kathleen Preyer, Penal Measures in the
American Colonies, 26 Am J Legal Hist 326, 349 (1982) ("Though hardly in disuse, those
punishments so dear to the lore about colonial America are, from the data we have at pre-
sent, clearly not a very characteristic mode of punishment.").
4 See Friedman, Crime and Punishment at 36-41 (describing, among other punish-
ments, branding letters on the foreheads of convicted criminals); Preyer, 26 Am J Legal
Hist at 334-35 (discussing punishments such as putting a cleft stick on a forked tongue for
swearing). See also Linda Kealey, Patterns of Punishment: Massachusetts in the Eight-
eenth Century, 30 Am J Legal Hist 163, 163 (1986). Compare generally William Andrews,
Old.Time Punishments (William Andrews 1890) (describing older English penalties).
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had not yet come into full bloom, was the prison.'
Today, in contrast, two options dominate the penal imagina-
tion: imprisonment and simple probation. From time to time we
do use a collection of intermediate sanctions between these ex-
tremes that includes traditional impositions like community
service and fines, as well as more recent innovations like inten-
sive probation supervision, house arrest, and boot camps.' Still,
"[b]etween overcrowded prisons and even more overcrowded pro-
bation, there is a near-vacuum .... .' Prison and probation con-
tinue to represent our punitive orthodoxy. But orthodoxy invites
challenge. Set aside the standard package of intermediate sanc-
tions and consider instead the following collection of sanctions
that have attracted considerable attention in the legal literature
and popular press alike:8
0 A woman convicted of drug possession is ordered to stand on
a street corner wearing a sign saying, "I got caught possess-
ing cocaine. Ordered by Judge Whitfield."9
For accounts of the rise of the penitentiary in the United States, see generally Adam
J. Hirsch, The Rise of the Penitentiary: Prisons and Punishment in Early America (Yale
1992); David J. Rothman, Discovery of the Asylum (Little, Brown 2d ed 1990). Some de-
signers of the early penitentiary envisioned that members of the public would be allowed
inside and inmates put "on display as if in a zoo." Friedman, Crime and Punishment at 77-
78 (cited in note 1).
' See, for example, Michael Tonry and Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, in Mi-
chael Tonry, ed, 20 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 99, 99-101 (1996) (providing
an overview of latest research on intermediate sanctions).
' Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, Between Prison and Probation 14 (Oxford 1990).
8 For recent student commentary, see generally Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern
Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 Duke L J
1357; Brian C. Erb, Developments in the Law-Creative Probation Conditions: Putting the
"Unusual"Back in "Cruel and Unusual"After Bateman, 24 Willamette L Rev 1155 (1988);
Jeffrey C. Filcik, Recent Development-Signs of the Times: Scarlet Letter Probation Condi-
tions, 37 Wash U J Urban & Contemp L 291 (1990); Rosilind L Kelley, Comment, Sen-
tenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations in Sentencing-Are They Constitu-
tional?, 93 Dickinson L Rev 759 (1989); Lemore H. Tavill, Note, Scarlet Letter Punishment:
Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty is Today's Probation Condition, 36 Cleve St L Rev 613
(1988). See also Marjorie H. Levin, Note, Corporate Probation Conditions: Judicial Crea-
tivity or Abuse of Discretion, 52 Fordham L Rev 637, 641-57 (1984) (describing the use of
nonmonetary sanctions on corporations).
' "Eye on America," CBS Morning News (CBS television broadcast, May 16, 1997). In
addition, a former stockbroker convicted of embezzlement is ordered to wear a similar sign
saying, "I am a convicted thief. Ordered by Judge Whitfield." Id. See also Creative Judge
Signs Off on Punishment, Tulsa World C8 (Apr 16, 1997) (A convicted burglar required to
wear a sign reading, "I am a convicted thief."); Jeanie Russell, Shame! Shame! Shame!,
Good Housekeeping 102 (Aug 1, 1997) (People caught shoplifting required to march in
front of the store with sign reading, "I STOLE FROM THIS STORE."); Staff, Woman Gets
Probation, Scarlet T-Shirt, Houston Chron A24 (May 25, 1994) (A woman convicted of
shoplifting required to wear T-shirt inscribed, "I was convicted of shoplifting."); Ann
Woolner, When The Sentence Is A Shame, Am Law 34 (Nov 1997) (A man convicted of theft
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" An offender convicted of DWI is ordered to paste a bumper
sticker on his car that reads, "CONVICTED: DWI."10 Another
DWI offender is ordered to attend church. 1
* Men convicted of soliciting prostitutes in Kansas City, Mis-
souri, have their faces and names displayed on the local
community access channel in a program popularly known as
"John TV."'2 Men in San Francisco, California, are required
to attend the "School for Johns," where former prostitutes
lecture them about life on the streets.13
in Hinesville, Georgia required as probation condition to walk around county courthouse
for thirty hours in two-hour stints with sign reading, "I AM A CONVICTED THIEF.").
Signs also have been used for sex offenders. See, for example, State v Bateman, 95 Or
App 456, 771 P2d 314, 316, 322 (1989) (en banc), overruled in part by State v Anderson,
113 Or App 416, 833 P2d 321, 323 (1992) (en banc) (A convicted sex offender is required to
post on the front door of his home, and on the doors of any car he drives, a sign that reads,
"DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER-NO CHILDREN ALLOWED."). See also State v Bur-
din, 924 SW2d 82, 84 (Tenn 1996) (A convicted felon is ordered to post sign describing
himself as convicted child molester.); Martha Brannigan and Karen Blumenthal, Courts
Using Humiliation as Punishment, Wall St J 11 (Nov 9, 1989) (A similar sanction imposed
on sex offender in Rhode Island.).
" People v Letterlough, 86 NY2d 259, 655 NE2d 146, 147 (1995). See also Goldschmitt
v State, 490 S2d 123, 124 (Fla Dist Ct App 1986) (per curiam) (requiring a convicted drunk
driver to affix to his car a bumper sticker reading, "Convicted D.U.I.-Restricted Li-
cense"). Shaming plates also have been offered to drunk drivers in the former Soviet re-
public of Estonia as an alternative to losing their licenses, but few seem to take it. See So-
viet Drivers Pass on "Shame Plates", LA Times 25 (Jan 25, 1987).
" See Joe Cook, Legal Quirk: The ACLU Versus Judge Thomas: Quirk Over Sentenc-
ing Defendants to Church, Liberty 11 (Dec 1995). See also ACLU Attacks Church Atten-
dance Ruling, Wash Post H12 (May 3, 1986) (A thief is required as condition of probation
to attend church.); Martha Middleton, Sentencing: The Alternatives, Natl L J 1 (Apr 23,
1984) (A "bad-check writer" sentenced "to attend church once a week for three years.");
Paul J. Toomey, Rude Driver Ordered to Serve Time in Church, The Record Al (Feb 1,
1996) (A man who intentionally bumped a vehicle at a toll plaza ordered to get counseling
from his minister.).
"See Edward Walsh, Kansas City Tunes In as New Program Aims at Sex Trade:
"John TV", Wash Post A3 (July 8, 1997). See also John Larrabee, Fighting crime with a
dose of shame, USA Today 3A (June 19, 1995) (describing similar programs in Miami,
Florida and La Mesa, California); The Shame Game, Boston Globe 14 (Apr 2, 1996) (edito-
rial) (mentioning similar effort by Boston police); Jane Prendergast, Prostitution John
Forced to Wear "Scarlet Letter", Cin Enq Al (Jan 30, 1998) (reporting a man convicted of
soliciting a prostitute was ordered to "wear[ ] a sign advertising that he tried to buy sex
and got caught"). Compare Larrabee, Fighting crime, USA Today at 3A (describing local
police captain in Taunton, Massachusetts who reads on local cable TV the names and al-
leged crimes of everyone arrested in the previous week). See generally Courtney Guyton
Persons, Note, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and
Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes' Patrons, 49 Vand L Rev 1525
(1996) (evaluating programs that publicize names of men who solicit prostitutes).
" See Michael J. Ybarra, Patrons Given a Graphic View of Prostitution, NY Times 18
(May 12, 1996). See also Alan Deutschman, The School for Johns, Playboy 46 (July 1,
1996).
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* A landlord in Syracuse, New York, whose building was con-
demned as a slum, is ordered to post a four-foot square sign
on the building that lists his name together with his phone
number.'4 A New York City landlord is sentenced to house
arrest in one of his own slums. 5
* A burglar in Memphis, Tennessee is ordered to allow his vic-
tim, accompanied by law enforcement personnel, to enter his
home unannounced and take something of comparable value
to what he stole. 6
" A juvenile convicted of throwing a brick, which blinded the
victim in one eye, is ordered to wear an eye patch. He is
permitted to take it off only when he sleeps. 7
" A man convicted of stealing $49 worth of T-bone steaks is or-
dered to give a "shaming speech," approved in advance by
the trial court, on the steps of the local courthouse."
1, See Edward M. Eveld, Shame makes a comeback, Kan City Star Al (May 16, 1997).
See also Larrabee, Fighting crime, USA Today at 3A (cited in note 12) (reporting similar
sanction used against landlord in Framingham, Massachusetts); Mike Nichols, Alderman
proposes shame signs for slum landlords, Milwaukee J Sent 1 (Sept 17, 1997) (describing
proposal to use similar sanctions against slumlords in Milwaukee and noting that "Chi-
cago recently adopted its own version of the Syracuse ordinance").
15 See Instead of Jail: 'Welcome, Reptile!", NY Times A22 (Feb 17, 1988). See also Paul
Feldman, More Counts on Slumlord Filed by City, LA Times 1 (Feb 20, 1986) (Similar
sanction imposed on Los Angeles landlord.); Judge Orders Landlord to Live in His Own
Slum, Chi Trib CIO (Jan 20, 1992) (Newark landlord); Scot Lehigh, Landlord Didn't 'Re-
side, Remain' in Unheated Flat, Boston Globe 47 (Nov 24, 1989) (Boston landlord). Simi-
larly, a man convicted of cruelty to animals for leaving three puppies to die at a city dump
during winter was given the option of spending two nights outside at the dump. See Ac-
cused Puppy Abuser Doesn't Like Cold, UPI (Feb 12, 1982).
Other landlords have been ordered personally to make the necessary repairs to their
dilapidated housing. See Alexis Jetter, Judge: Slumlord to Make Repairs, Newsday 33
(Dec 26, 1988). See also Edward A. Adams, Unusual Sentence for Landlord is Upheld, NY
L J 1 (May 28, 1991) (A landlord is ordered to work with professional consultants to design
a rehabilitation plan for his buildings.).
" See Joe B. Brown, Judge Devises Instructional Penalties, NY Times B16 (Feb 13,
1993) (noting that "victims often take back from burglars what was taken from them").
See also Paula Dittrick, Judges Turn to Alternative Sentences, UPI (Oct 24, 1982) (noting
North Carolina program in which housebreakers return to crime scene and meet with vic-
tims in the hope that the offender will "realize the emotional impact the victim experi-
enced"); Humiliation: Judges Say Crooks Should be Made To Feel Ashamed, Salt Lake
Trib Al (Dec 17, 1996) (describing similar punishment in Utah).
" See Debbie Salamone, Judge Orders Teen Who Maimed Tourists to Wear Eye Patch,
Orlando Sent Al (May 30, 1996). See also A Fine Precedent, Orlando Sent A6 (June 4,
1996) (editorial).
' See David Doege, Shaming Sentences Group is Diverse, Milwaukee J Sent 1 (Apr 6,
1997). See also Judge Orders Man To Confess Crime in Church, UPI (Jan 7, 1984).
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" A man who rammed his car into another car being driven by
an interracial couple is required to watch "Mississippi
Burning."19
" A man convicted of selling fake insurance policies to Mary-
land horse trainers is required to clean out the stalls of Bal-
timore's mounted police unit.20
What's going on here?"
One possibility is shame. On this view, these punishments
expose the offender to public view and heap ignominy upon him
in a way that other alternative sanctions to imprisonment, like
fines and community service, do not. Reminiscent of Hawthorne's
famous scarlet letter,' they shame offenders, and purposefully so,
with modern methods of communication serving as "virtual p1l-
"See Man Sentenced to See "Mississippi Burning", UPI (Mar 9, 1989).
See Maryland Stable Duty Sentence, Wash Post D5 (Aug 10, 1989).
21 For present purposes, I leave aside public notification statutes, like Megan's Law,
and biological interventions, like chemical castration, both of which also have attracted
considerable attention. As I see it, the primary aim of these sanctions is neither to shame
nor to educate.
Public notification statutes appear designed primarily to protect third parties. Com-
pare E.B. v Verniero, 119 F3d 1077, 1100 (3d Cir 1997), rehearing en banc denied, 127 F3d
298 (1997) (concluding that "various forms of state warnings about threats to public safety
provide more apt analogies" to public notification statutes than do shaming penalties). Ac-
cord Doe v Pataki, 120 F3d 1263, 1284 (2d Cir 1997), amended, rehearing denied, 1997 US
App LEXIS 26426 (2d Cir) ("[Niotification is... intended to serve the goals of protecting
the public and facilitating future law enforcement efforts."). See also Abril R. Bedarf,
Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 Cal L Rev 885, 906
(1995) ("Sex offender notification laws are premised on the belief that community knowl-
edge about sex offenders will empower residents to protect themselves.").
Biological interventions appear designed primarily to incapacitate selectively. Com-
pare Steven S. Kan, Corporal Punishment and Optimal Incapacitation, 25 J Legal Stud
121, 130 (1996) (arguing for use of temporary incapacitative measures targeted at par-
ticular organs implicated in criminal wrongdoing). See also Sheldon Gelman, The Biologi-
cal Alteration Cases, 36 Wm & Mary L Rev 1203, 1213 (1995) (arguing that biological in-
terventions should be subject to "strict scrutiny"); Connie S. Rosati, A Study of Internal
Punishments, 1994 Wis L Rev 123, 125 (offering a "qualified, philosophical defense of in-
ternal punishment").
Nor do I directly address any special problems raised by so-called "publicity" sanctions
imposed on corporate criminal defendants. See generally Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Pub-
licity-An Alternative Punitive Damage Sanction, 45 DePaul L Rev 341, 343 (1996) (pro-
posing that "companies' wrongdoing should be broadcast over the Internet on a dedicated
World Wide Web page entitled 'Punitive Damages Awards"); Jeffrey S. Parker, Rules
Without... : Some Critical Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 71 Wash U L
Q 397, 426-32 (1993) (arguing that the Federal Sentencing Guideline authorizing adverse
publicity is ultra vires); Andrew Cowan, Note, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punish-
ment by Publicity Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S Cal L Rev 2387, 2389 (1992)
(concluding that federal "guidelines for adverse publicity.., provide an innovative and
theoretically sound sanction thatjudges should have at their disposal").
' See Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter 57 (first published 1850) (St Martin's
1992) ("[T]he point which drew all eyes... was that SCARLET LETTER.").
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lor[ies]. Moreover, at a time when the costs of imprisonment
consume ever larger shares of state budgets,24 shame may serve
as a politically viable and cost-effective way of achieving deter-
rence, specific and general, as well as of satisfying the legitimate
demands of retribution.
I want to suggest, however, that something else lies behind
some of these sanctions. Although shame may explain many of
them, it cannot account for them all. For example, shame in-
volves an audience,25 and while some of these sanctions require
an offender to publicize his offense to an audience that ordinarily
would be unaware of it, not all of them do. Some of them are car-
ried out in relative privacy. If not shame, then what is the ap-
peal?
The answer I give is education, but education of a peculiar
sort. The education I have in mind is peculiar because it trades
on the widely discredited though strangely enduring principle of
lex talionis, or law of talion, popularly known as an "eye for an
eye."
26
A literal reading of lex talionis is routinely derided as a
senselessly cruel formula for punishment, and rightly so. A better
reading, which I advance here, eschews this literal construction
and instead construes the talionic principle against the back-
ground of a theory of punishment known as the moral education,
or moral reform, theory. As explained more fully below," this ap-
pealing but largely neglected theory tries to transcend the ongo-
ing debate between retributivism and utilitarianism and to avoid
Larrabee, Fighting crime, USA Today at 3A (cited in note 12). See also Now, Cyber-
Pillory Stocks, Nal L J A8 (July 7, 1997) (names of offenders posted on World Wide Web);
Michael Schrage, Should Virus Carriers Wear a Scarlet V?., ComputerWorld 37B (Jan 27,
1997) (urging publication of names of those who introduce viruses into computer net-
works).
"See, for example, Stan C. Proband, Corrections Leads State Budget Increases in FY
1997, Overcrowded Times 4 (Aug 1997) ("[T]otal state appropriations for corrections were
projected to increase by 6.2 percent in FY 1997, the biggest increase of any category.").
"See, for example, Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-
Assessment 53 (Clarendon 1985) ("[Sihame introduces ... the notion of an audience, for
feeling shame is connected with the thought that eyes are upon one.").
"See Black's Law Dictionary 913 (6th ed 1990) (Lex talionis "requires the infliction
upon a wrongdoer of the same injury which he has caused to another' and is "[e]xpressed
in the Mosaic law by the formula, 'an eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth, eta."). The life for
life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth" formulation of lex talionis appears only in the Bible, most
famously in Exodus 21:23-25, and Leviticus 24:18, and may have enjoined the literal, post-
mortem mutilation of offenders who had been executed for capital offenses. See Calum
Carmichael, The Spirit of Biblical Law 104, 107 (Georgia 1996) ("[T]he formula means ex-
actly what it says .... It means a life for a life-to be followed by the systematic mutila-
tion of the offender's corpse.").
" See Part HI.A.
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the pitfalls of rehabilitation. It recommends the infliction of hard-
ship on an offender that "mirrors" his own wrongdoing in order to
morally "educate" him, to make him see the error of his ways, and
ideally, to lead him to repentance. Punishments should aim to re-
flect back on the offender what he has done to his victim, which is
the essence of the talionic principle.
Punishments widely described as "shaming" penalties thus
come in two basic but very different forms: those that rely on
public exposure and aim at shaming; and those that do not rely
on public exposure and aim at educating. The rise of these pun-
ishments may turn out to be a short-lived blip in the evolution of
penal sanctions." Indeed, many of these sanctions appear to be
largely the work of a handful of especially innovative judges.29
Yet, if these sanctions do become a more prevalent feature of our
punitive practices,0 judges should appreciate that they reflect
two very different approaches to the problem of punishment.
In Part I, I introduce the shaming and educating models of
punishment. I distinguish two dimensions of punishment--ex-
pressive and justificatory-that give the models their structure
and explain how the models differ from one another along each
dimension.
In Part II, I look more closely at the shaming model.3 Under
the right circumstances shaming may live up to its billing as a
cost effective and politically viable alternative to imprisonment.
But shame has its problems. Most importantly, it menaces cer-
tain ideals that any morally respectable mode of punishment
should honor, not the least of which is human dignity.2
See, for example, Steven Greenhut, Gimmicky Judges" 'Shame' Sanctions Unlikely to
Curb Crime, Milwaukee J Sent All (Apr 13, 1997) (arguing against the adoption of
shaming sanctions).
' Some of these judges have been accused of using creative sentencing as a publicity
stunt to gain reelection. See, for example, Brown, Instructional Penalties, NY Times at
B16 (cited in note 16).
' See, for example, Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal
Reform, 3 Psych, Pub Pol, & L 645, 689 (1997) ("Although these sanctions began as iso-
lated events, they have now captured judicial and popular attention in ways that feed into
the more general cultural critiques that blame our shamelessness for a host of social ills,
and that may lead to their proliferation.").
" See Dan Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U Chi L Rev 591, 630-53
(1996) (developing the shaming model).
Shaming punishments can be challenged on constitutional grounds, including the
First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and religion and the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. See, for example, Goldschmitt,'
490 S2d at 125-26 (entertaining and rejecting First and Eighth Amendment challenges to
requiring "CONVICTED D.U.I.-RESTRICTED LICENSE" bumper sticker as probation
condition). See also Brilliant, Note, 1989 Duke L J at 1385 (cited in note 8) (concluding
that scarlet letter probation conditions "constitute punishment ... [and] should be subject
1998] 739
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Accordingly, in Part III, I develop an alternative model,
which I call the educating model. For many creative punish-
ments, this model is descriptively more accurate than shame.
Moreover, it supplies them with a different and more appealing
normative foundation. Ironically, the cornerstone of that founda-
tion is, I suggest, none other than the principle of lex talionis.
Now, one can certainly read that principle to support ugly and
cruel forms of punishment, but again, I link the talionic principle
to the moral education theory of punishment in which it functions
as a mechanism of moral reform.
Finally, in Part IV, I turn to the actual practice of educating
through punishment. I examine a representative sample of edu-
cating penalties and contrast them with their shaming counter-
parts. Some of these penalties comport nicely with the moral edu-
cation theory and under the right circumstances should be en-
couraged. Others, however, teach no lesson, or worse, teach the
wrong lesson and should be discouraged.
I. DIMENSIONS OF THE MODELS
Punishment has two dimensions: expressive and justifica-
tory. Both of the models of creative punishments I develop here
are built on these two dimensions, but the models differ signifi-
cantly along each of them.
The justificatory dimension of punishment should be famil-
iar. It answers the questions: What justifies punishment? What is
the moral point of inflicting hardship on criminal wrongdoers?
The traditional answers, of course, come from retributivism and
utilitarianism.' Retributivism looks to the past and finds pun-
to the eighth amendment's 'dignity of man' standard"). I take no position on these consti-
tutional questions.
' Although these two dimensions are treated separately in the analysis that follows,
their precise relationship is unclear. According to some accounts, the expressive dimension
of punishment is analytically independent of the justificatory dimension. See, for example,
Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, reprinted in Joel Feinberg, Doing
and Deserving 98 (Princeton 1970). Other accounts, in contrast, imply that the expressive
dimension may reduce to the justificatory dimension. For example, the expressive dimen-
sion, and especially the fimction it serves in morally condemning the offender's conduct, is
sometimes taken to be a form of retributivism. See, for example, Robert Nozick, Philo-
sophical Explanations 370 (Harvard 1981) ("Retributive punishment is an act of commu-
nicative behavior."). See also Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in
Wesley Cragg, ed, Retributivism and Its Critics 1, 2-3 (Steiner 1992) ("This idea that pun-
ishment expresses condemnation or censure looks retributive."). Alternatively, the expres-
"sive dimension is taken to be a form of utilitarianism. See, for example, Michael S. Moore,
The Moral Worth of Retribution, in Ferdinand Schoeman, ed, Responsibility, Character,
and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology 179, 181 (Oxford 1987).
1 See generally Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 35-61 (Stan-
ford 1968) (discussing traditional justifications of punishment).
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ishment justified if and only if the offender deserves it. The point
of punishment is to do justice. Utilitarianism, in contrast, looks to
the future and finds punishment justified if and only if it en-
hances social utility. The point is to reduce crime.
The expressive dimension of punishment, however, is less
familiar. Longstanding philosophical analysis holds that punish-
ment is the "infliction of hard treatment by an authority on a per-
son for his failure in some respect (usually an infraction of a rule
or command)." 5 Yet this analysis is incomplete, because it ignores
much of what makes punishment a distinctive social practice.
Punishment does indeed impose material "hard treatment," but it
does more. It speaks. It says something.36 Punishment, in other
words, is a form of language." But what does punishment say?
At the very least, it says that the offender's act was wrong
and will not be tolerated. In a word, punishment, unlike civil
sanctions, condemns." It is "a conventional device for the expres-
sion of attitudes of resentment and indignation."9 It expresses
condemnation much like champagne at a wedding expresses cele-
bration, or black dress at a funeral expresses mourning. The con-
ventions or social norms by which punishment "speaks" are a
product or artifact of culture and history. Of course, these con-
ventions, like those governing natural languages, do change, but
at any particular moment they are relatively stable and impose
"objective" constraints on how we can effectively express our con-
demnation.0 We could not, for example, condemn an offender's
I Feinberg, Expressive Function at 95 (cited in note 33), citing Antony G. Flew, The
Justification of Punishment, 29 Phil 289, 291-307 (1954); Stanley I. Benn, An Approach to
the Problems of Punishment, 33 Phil 325, 325-41 (1958); H.LA. Hart, Prolegomenon to the
Principles of Punishment, 60 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1 (1959-60).
"For the most influential discussion of this dimension, see Feinberg, Expressive Func-
tion at 98 (cited in note 33) ("Punishment... has a symbolic significance largely missing
from other kinds of penalties"). See also Igor Primoratz, Punishment as Language, 64 Phil
187, 188 (1989) (discussing the "main varieties of normative expressionism"); A.J. Skillen,
How to Say Things with Walls, 55 Phil 509, 513-15 (1980) (distinguishing different senses
of "expression"). Compare Michael Davis, Punishment as Language: Misleading Analogy
for Desert Theorists, 10 L & Phil 311, 312 (1991) (arguing that "expressionism adds noth-
ing of value to (traditional) retributivism").
" Although these two aspects of punishment-material and expressive-are analyti-
cally distinct, they are related, because the material hardship imposed on an offender is
the medium that conveys the message.
See, for example, Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L & Con-
temp Probs 401, 404 (1958) ("What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all
that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community condemnation which
accompanies and justifies its imposition."); Paul Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction
and the Utility of Desert, 76 BU L Rev 201, 202 (1996) (noting that "criminal sanctions
signal condemnation").
Feinberg, Expressive Function at 98 (cited in note 33).
See, for example, Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 597-98 (cited in note 31). See also Eliza-
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conduct by giving him a parade any more than we could mean
"hot" by saying "cold." Despite our intentions, our efforts at com-
munication would misfire.
These two dimensions-expressive and justificatory-struc-
ture the two models of creative punishments. In the shaming
model, the expressive dimension of punishment is "monologic."
When the state speaks through punishment, it condemns the of-
fender's conduct, but that's all. It makes no pretense of saying
anything more. Punishment thus forms an occasion for the state
to speak to the offender (and the wider public), without seeking a
response from him in turn. As for the justificatory dimension of
punishment, the shaming model rests on the familiar theories of
retributivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation."
The educating model differs along both dimensions. Its ex-
pressive dimension is "dialogic." When the state speaks through
punishment, it tries to engage the offender in a moral dialogue.
As in the shaming model, the sanction imposed on the offender is
intended to convey moral disapprobation and disapproval of his
wrongdoing, but it aspires to do more. It tries to elicit a particular
response from him. It attempts to show him why what he has
done was wrong in the hope of getting him to repent. Such a re-
sponse may not always be forthcoming, but that is all right. The
model accepts the possibility of educative failure. In the educat-
ing model, therefore, punishment forms an occasion for the state
to speak with the offender, not just at him.
The educating model also differs from the shaming model
along the justificatory dimension. Whereas retribution, deter-
rence, and rehabilitation justify punishment under the shaming
model, the moral education theory supplies the justification for
punishment in the educating model. Although this theory is re-
lated to both retributivism and utilitarianism, it is distinct from
both and reducible to neither. Nor is it simply rehabilitation by
another name.
beth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 18 (Harvard 1993) (Social norms provide a
"publicly intelligible vehicle" by which to express valuations.); Cass Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum L Rev 903, 917 (1996) ("Norms establish conventions
about the meanings of actions.").
4 See, for example, Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law,
89 Mich L Rev 1880, 1891-99 (1991) (discussing shaming in the context of retributivism,
deterrence, and rehabilitation). See also Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 601-05 (cited in note
31) (explaining how "expressive theory" can "inform" retributivism and deterrence).
Shaming penalties also can "incapacitate" insofar as they publicize an offender's wrong-
doing to third parties, who can then steer clear of him. See, for example, Massaro, 89 Mich
L Rev at 1900.
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The various dimensions of each model will be fleshed out in
more detail in the analysis that follows.
1I. THE SHAMING MODEL
Many creative punishments qualify as "shaming penalties."
They require an offender to publicize his offense to an audience
that under normal circumstances would be unaware of it; moreo-
ver, as a result of this publicity, the penalties may cause the of-
fender to suffer an unpleasant-perhaps even painful--emotional
experience, usually described as "shame."
Shaming penalties come in different forms. For example, an
offender might be required to publicize his offense by standing in
public view wearing a sign,42 by putting a bumper sticker on his
car,' by wearing a T-shirt, by placing a sign on his property,'
by giving a public speech,46 by taking out an ad in the local news-
paper or in a trade magazine, 47 or even by posting a message on
the World Wide Web." While shame can be used to punish any of-
fense, shaming penalties are typically reserved for sex and mor-
als offenses (prostitution), commercial offenses (embezzlement),
and minor offenses (shoplifting).49 First-time offenders are an-
other favorite target of shame.'
But what is the appeal of shame?
A. Shame's Appeal
One possibility, which has been most ably developed and de-
fended by Dan Kahan, is economic."' According to Kahan, shame
42 See, for example, Creative Judge Signs Offon Punishment, Tulsa World at C8 (cited
in note 9).
See, for example, Goldschmitt v State, 490 S2d 123, 124 (Fla Dist Ct App 1986) (per
curiam).
"See, for example, Staff, Scarlet T-Shirt, Houston Chron at A24 (cited in note 9).
"See, for example, Nichols, Slum Landlords, Milwaukee J Sent at 1 (cited in note 14).
"See, for example, Doege, Group is Diverse, Milwaukee J Sent at 1 (cited in note 18).
'See, for example, Julia C. Martinez, Judges Using 'Shame Punishment' More to Em-
phasize a Message, Fla Times-Union F1 (Feb 16, 1997) (noting that a butcher shop was or-
dered to place ad in local paper confessing that it had "sold meat that consisted 'in whole
or in part of filthy, putrid and contaminated substances' and was 'unfit for human food").
" See, for example, Now, Cyberpillory Stocks, Natl L J at A8 (cited in note 23).
" See, for example, James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanc-
tions?, 107 Yale L J 1055, 1064 (1998). Of course, shame also can be deployed against of-
fenders imprisoned for more serious offenses. The recent reappearance of the chain gang is
an example. See, for example, John Leland and Vern E. Smith, Back on the Chain Gang,
Newsweek 58 (May 15, 1995); Brent Staples, The Chain Gang Show, NY Times Mag 62
(Sept 17, 1995).
See Whitman, 107 Yale L J at 1064.
'z Economics is not the only possibility. We can identify at least two others, one cul-
tural, the other sociological. The cultural explanation links shame's appeal to a larger cul-
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may help solve an expensive public problem. 2 The problem is
this: Prison is both costly and overused. For some offenders, espe-
cially nonviolent ones, imprisonment is too harsh but straight
probation is too lenient. We need something in between. The con-
ventional alternatives to imprisonment and probation, mainly
fines and community service, might work, but they present yet
another problem. Judges, it seems, simply don't use them very
much,' or at least not as much as one might hope or expect. Why
not? Kahan's answer, which at last gets us to shame, involves
punishment's expressive dimension.5'
tural critique. According to this critique, Americans have lost their sense of shame. For
example, they appear on "Oprah" and talk of things their parents would never have
dreamed of making public. From this perspective, the appeal of shaming penalties rests on
the hope that they might help restore a lost sense of modesty. For a sampling of this cul-
tural critique, see the essays collected in Digby Anderson, ed, This Will Hurt: The Restora-
tion of Virtue and Civic Order (Social Affairs Unit 1995). See also James Twitchell, For
Shame: The Loss of Common Decency in American Culture (St. Martin's 1997). For a
strong critique of this Kulturkampf, see Massaro, 3 Psych, Pub Pol, & L at 647 (cited in
note 30) ("ITihe new shame rhetoric ... often betrays no genuine concern for the people it
condemns."). See also Whitman, 107 Yale L J at 1077 (cited in note 49) (describing Victo-
rian critique of shaming penalties according to which such public displays "tended to
loosen fetters of decent comportment") (emphasis added); Carl F. Horowitz, The Shaming
Sham, Am Prospect 70-71 (Mar-Apr 1997) (paraphrasing Oliver Stone in stating that
"shaming at heart is McCarthyisf').
The sociological explanation links shame's appeal to the social function of punishment.
Punishment, on this view, operates to condemn conduct that violates a society's moral
code (or, in Durkheimian terms, its "collective conscience") and thereby reinforce that
code. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 63 (Free Press 1984) (W.D. Halls,
trans). In order to serve this function, punishment requires a public degradation cere-
mony. See Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 Am J
Soc 420, 422-23 (1956) (outlining features of "status degradation ceremonies"). However,
with the rise of the penitentiary as the dominant form of punishment, and the rise of plea
bargaining as the criminal law's dominant mode of adjudication, no such ceremony exists
in the modem world. Public shaming penalties thus represent society's effort to satisfy a
basic functional need.
Kahan has appeared in support of shame on The Today Show," on National Public
Radio, and in the pages of The Wall Street Journal. See, for example, Using Shame and
Guilt as Punishment for Crimes, "Weekend Edition," National Public Radio, (Mar 23,
1996) (radio transcript); Dan M. Kahan, It's a Shame We Have None, Wall St J A16 (Jan
15, 1997). See also Henry J. Reske, Scarlet Letter Sentences, ABA J 16 (Jan 1996) (high-
lighting Kahan's thesis). His ideas also have been applauded by conservative syndicated
columnist George Will. See George F. Will, It's Cheaper Than Prison: Shame the Bad
Guys, Sacramento Bee F2 (Feb 25, 1996). Even The New York Times, specifically men-
tioning Kahan's work, has given shame a cautious endorsement. See Alternative Sentenc-
ing, NY Times A16 (Jan 20, 1997) (editorial).
See Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 591 (cited in note 31) (stating that "fines and commu-
nity service... are used sparingly and with great reluctance").
" The other possibility involves what Kahan refers to as the "conventional answer":
the "failure of democratic politics." Id at 592 (cited in note 31). In other words, politicians
have failed to explain to the public why these sanctions are indeed the right ones for the
job, leaving the public unaware of just how punitive these sanctions can really be. See id.
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According to Kahan, some alternatives to imprisonment,
such as fines and community service, are "expressively inade-
quate."' Unlike imprisonment,56 they don't say the right thing
(i.e., don't condemn as punishment should), or at least don't say
the right thing clearly enough. Fines are expressively ambiguous
punishments because they make it look like an offender can buy
his way out of punishment, and most of us don't think criminal
acts should be subject to market logic.57 Similarly, community
service is ambiguous because service to the community is some-
thing civic-minded people do that wins them public praise and es-
teem, not something criminals do for punishment."
In contrast, shaming penalties, Kahan claims, speak with a
clear and commanding voice. They express moral condemnation
of the offender's conduct far better than alternative sanctions
such as fines and community service.59 Consequently, shaming
penalties can win public approval as viable, cost-effective alterna-
tives to imprisonment, whereas fines and community service, be-
cause of their expressive inadequacy, cannot."o Indeed, according
to Kahan, the "political acceptability of shaming penalties.., is
nearly an established fact."6'
Whether a particular sanction adequately expresses moral
condemnation turns on that sanction's social meaning, which one
can identify only through social and cultural interpretation. As a
" Id at 622. Kahan does not explore the social meaning of other intermediate sanc-
tions, such as intensive probation supervision, house arrest, and boot camps. Nor do I.
" For an attempt to explain why imprisonment is shameful, see Eric Posner, Shaming
Penalties in the Criminal Law 19-22 (1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi L
Rev).
"7 See Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 622-24 (cited in note 31) (discussing collective evi-
dence for this claim).
" See id at 627-29 (presenting expressions of this sentiment).
" Courts may therefore be more likely to impose shaming penalties on offenders whom
they would otherwise sentence to short terms of imprisonment. See Kahan, 63 U Chi L
Rev at 635 (cited in note 31). By contrast, courts commonly impose non-shaming interme-
diate sanctions on offenders who would otherwise be sentenced to straight probation. See
Tonry and Lynch, 20 Crime and Justice at 101-02 (cited in note 6). For alternatives to
shaming that also combat this "net-widening" problem, see id at 134-37 (suggesting that
shifting discretion to corrections officials or reworking existing sentencing guidelines can
help solve this problem).
" However, fines and community service might be made to speak more clearly and ex-
press condemnation less equivocally by giving them a shaming twist, for example, by re-
quiring an offender who performs community service to wear clothing that identifies him
as an offender. See, for example, Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 649-52 (cited in note 31) (de-
scribing how shame might be used to supplement fines and community service). See also
Russell, Good Housekeeping at 162 (cited in note 9) (describing probationer who was re-
quired to perform community service wearing a "fluorescent orange vest with a neon yel-
low band and bold black letters on front and back that read: probationer at work").
"1 Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 637 (cited in note 31).
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result, claims about the "social meaning" of any particular mode
of punishment are bound to be more or less controversial.62 If
shaming penalties do indeed express condemnation better than
fines and community service, that may help explain why they
might be more politically acceptable than the alternatives. But
how do shaming penalties measure up against the requirements
of retributivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation?
B. Is Shame Justified?
The answer is unclear. Doubts about shame exist on several
grounds. In the final analysis, however, these doubts seem too
weak to warrant rejecting shame altogether, especially if it can
reduce our (over)reliance on imprisonment.
1. Retribution.
The core claim of retributivism holds that an offender should
be punished, i.e., should experience suffering or hard treatment,
because and only because he deserves it.'a Although this claim
may be intuitively obvious, retributivists have said a great deal
in defense of it. Indeed, the many "theories" of retributivism de-
veloped since Kant can fairly be seen as efforts to elaborate upon
this central proposition.' Insofar as shaming penalties inflict de-
See id at 607 (noting the difficulty of empirically analyzing social meaning). How-
ever, a surprisingly high degree of consensus exists among people over the severity of al-
ternative sanctions when they are fully informed about what kinds of deprivations those
sanctions entail. See, for example, Robert E. Harlow, John M. Darley, and Paul H. Robin-
son, The Severity of Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A Psychophysical Scaling Approach for
Obtaining Community Perceptions, 11 J Quant Criminol 71, 86 (1995) ('[T]here was a rea-
sonable consensus about the relative severities of the various alternative[ I [sanctions]
that we examined.").
See, for example, Moore, Moral Worth at 179 (cited in note 33) ("A retributivist
punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves it.").
" For an effort to sort out various forms of retributivism, see John Cottingham, Varie-
ties of Retribution, 29 Phil Q 238, 238-45 (1979) (identifying nine varieties of retributiv-
ism).
For elaborations upon the basic retributive claim, see Moore, Moral Worth at 183
(cited in note 33) (retribution as best account of more particular moral judgment); Wojci-
ech Sadurski, Giving Desert Its Due: Social Justice and Legal Theory 225-33 (D. Reidel
1985) (retribution as balancing of benefits and burdens); George Sher, Desert 69-90
(Princeton 1987) (same); Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions 7 (Clarendon 1993)
(retribution as expression of condemnation); Jean Hampton, A New Theory of Retribution,
in R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, eds, Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law
and Morals 377, 396 (Cambridge 1991) (retribution as symbolic defeat of wrongdoer); Her-
bert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 Monist 475, 477-78 (1968) (retribution as bal-
ancing of benefits and burdens).
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served suffering on an offender, shame appears to enjoy solid re-
tributivist backing.'
From a retributivist perspective, the problem with shame is
not whether it inflicts suffering but whether it inflicts propor-
tional suffering. Retributivism insists not only that suffering be
deserved, but also that the "severity" of the suffering be propor-
tional to the "moral seriousness" or "moral blameworthiness" of
the offense." Indeed, its insistence on proportionality is one of the
main sources of retributivism's appeal.
When dealing with fines or imprisonment, which are meas-
urable in terms of dollars and time, respectively, claims about
proportionality between the crime and the punishment make
sense.67 The thinking goes roughly like this: First, find some way
to evaluate the comparative moral seriousness of various of-
fenses," then rank them from most to least serious. Next, rank
the universe of possible punishments from most to least severe.69
Then match the worst offense with the most severe punishment
and work down from there. The task, of course, is much more
complicated than this simple picture suggests." But it is not im-
possible. Indeed, the sentencing guidelines of many states reflect
" See, for example, Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 602 (cited in note 31) (arguing that the
"proper retributive punishment is the one that appropriately expresses condemnation,'
which shaming penalties do); Whitman, 107 Yale L J at 1062 (cited in note 49) ("[S]hame
sanctions ... seem beautifully retributive.").
"See, for example, Moore, Moral Worth at 180 (cited in note 33) (Retributivists "are
committed to the principle that punishment should be graded in proportion to desert.").
See, for example, Michael Davis, How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 93
Ethics 726, 736-42 (1983) (describing the proper method for scaling penalties). See also
John Kleinig, Punishment and Desert 115-20 (Martinus Nijhoff 1973) (same); C.L. Ten,
Crime, Guilt, and Punishment 154-55 (Oxford 1987) (same); Andrew von Hirsch, Doing
Justice: The Choice of Punishments 132-40 (Northeastern 1976) (same).
, See, for example, Ten, Crime at 155 (The "moral seriousness of an offence is a func-
tion of two major factors-the harm done by the offence and the culpability of the offender
as indicated by his mental state at the time of committing the offence."). Grades of culpa-
bility are usually ranked by reference to traditional categories of mens rea. For an effort to
grade degrees of criminal harm, see Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, Gauging
Criminal Harm: A Living Standard Analysis, 11 Oxford J Legal Stud 1, 7-16 (1991) (ar-
guing that the degree of criminal harm should be determined by the extent to which it di-
minishes the victim's "quality of life").
"See, for example, von Hirsch, Censure at 33-35 (cited in note 64) (defending "living
standard" method for assessing the severity of criminal penalties); Paul Robinson and
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw U L Rev 453, 488 (1995) (arguing "for a
criminal law based upon principles of desert, specifically, principles of desert as shared by
the community").
For example, one needs some way to "anchor" the penalty scale or, in other words, to
establish cardinal, and not simply ordinal, rankings. See, for example, von Hirsch, Cen-
sure at 36-46 (cited in note 64). See also Lawrence Crocker, The Upper Limit of Just Pun-
ishment, 41 Emory L J 1059, 1071-72 (1992) (arguing that lex talionis is an "instance" of a
broader principle of reciprocity and "can be seen as providing an upper limit for criminal
punishment).
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the conviction that the task can be successfully accomplished, at
least when dealing with terms of imprisonment.7
Shame complicates this picture.72 Insofar as shaming penal-
ties, unlike fines and imprisonment, are intended to make an of-
fender's actual emotional response a part of the severity of the
sanction, they make the proportionality calculus much more diffi-
cult, increasing the risk of disproportionate punishment. If the
retributive "bite" of shaming penalties comes from getting the of-
fender actually to experience the adverse and unpleasant emotion
of shame, judges will have a tough time figuring out just which
offenders will have that experience (and how much they will suf-
fer as a result) and which will not.7 And they will at least some-
times get it wrong if they try.
Shaming penalties may be disproportionately too weak, or
disproportionately too strong. First, shame may be too weak and
thus not "work" at all on certain offenders, especially those who
are socially alienated and disaffected. Shame depends on an of-
fender having attachments to others in whose eyes he or she can,
as a result of those attachments, suffer shame.74 An offender has
to care what others think about him; otherwise, shame can get no
grip on him. The broader and deeper his attachments, the greater
will be his shame. If he lacks the requisite attachments, how-
11 Compare Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 13-15 (Oxford 1996) (explaining how
many sentencing guidelines are based on "just deserts" rationale but criticizing these
guidelines for ignoring morally relevant differences between offenders).
More traditional intermediate sanctions (for example, community service, intensive
probation supervision, house arrest, and boot camp) also make proportionality analysis
more difficult. For efforts to develop ways to compare the "severity" of these intermediate
sanctions with each other and with imprisonment, see Harlow, Darley, and Robinson, 11 J
Quant Criminol at 75-76 (cited in note 62) (using "cross-modality matching of magnitude
scaling techniques" to compare relative severity of intermediate sanctions); von Hirsch,
Censure at 34-35 (cited in note 64) (defending "interest-analysis" approach to measuring
severity of punishments); Martha F. Schiff, Gauging the Intensity of Traditional and In-
termediate Punishments: Developing the Criminal Penalty Severity Scale 55-58 (1992) (un-
published dissertation on file with the U Chi L Rev) (same).
See, for example, Massaro, 3 Psych, Pub Pol, & L at 655 (cited in note 30) ("The
emotional impact [of shaming a person] may range from none, to mild discomfort, to a pro-
found and complete loss of self that inspires a desire to die").
, Sociologists sometimes draw a distinction between shame cultures and guilt cul-
thres. Japan is usually presented as a paradigmatic shame culture, while the United
States is often presented as a paradigmatic guilt culture. See, for example, Ruth Benedict,
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture 222-25 (Houghton Mif-
flin 1946). This distinction may or may not be a useful tool for analyzing culture. See, for
example, Millie R. Creighton, Revisiting Shame and Guilt Cultures: A Forty-Year Pilgrim-
age, 18 Ethos 279, 280-92 (1990) (defending the distinction). Nevertheless, it hardly sup-
ports the claim that citizens of the United States are immune to the emotional experience
of shame.
7' On the other hand, it is also more likely that his community will forgive him and ac-
cept him back into the fold if he expresses remorse for his wrongdoing.
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ever, he will, in a word, be "shameless," and subjecting him to a
shaming penalty will have little retributive bite. The same is true
if his attachments run to a criminal subculture, in which case
"shaming" him may perversely become a source of pride.
Second, shaming penalties may be disproportionately too
strong. If shame may not work at all on some offenders, it may
work all too well on others. Shame is, or can be, a powerful emo-
tion largely because its impact encompasses the self as a whole.76
At the extreme, shame can result in self-destruction as the sub-
ject of shame tries to rid himself of it through suicide.77 Of course,
less extreme responses like exiting from (and so hiding from the
view of) the community are also possible and probably more likely.
Still, where shame "works," it may impose hardships no one
thinks the shamed offender really deserves.78
According to Kahan, however, this approach to proportional-
ity asks too much.79 Shaming penalties cannot fairly be assessed
by whether or not, and to what extent, any particular offender
suffers the emotional experience of shame.. After all, other crimi-
nal sanctions such as imprisonment exact a difficult-to-predict
psychological and emotional toll that varies from one offender to
" See, for example, Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt at 89 (cited in note 25). One pair of
writers characterized shame "in the wrong hands" as the "nitroglycerin of emotions."
Jonathan Alter and Pat Wingert, The Return of Shame, Newsweek 21 (Feb 6, 1995).
See, for example, Persons, Note, 49 Vand L Rev at 1527 (cited in note 12) (reporting
one man who committed suicide after his name was published for soliciting a prostitute);
Woolner, Am Law at 35 (cited in note 9) (reporting case of a young man who committed
suicide when his mother found out about his DUI conviction). Of course, prison inmates
also commit suicide. See, for example, David Lester and Bruce L. Danto, Suicide Behind
Bars: Prediction and Prevention 24 (Charles 1993) (describing the profile of the "typical
suicidal inmate" in "police lockups" as one who kills himself because, among other things,
he "feels embarrassed, especially over the impact his arrest will have on his family").
" Compounding this difficulty is the problem of spillover. For example, if an offender
has a family, some of the shame he accrues may spill over onto his family members, who
may unfairly be subject to the community's scorn. See, for example, von Hirsch, Censure at
86-87 (cited in note 64) (noting that noncustodial penalties may have greater potential for
third party impact than imprisonment). When a husband's face appears on the local cable
access channel for soliciting a prostitute, it may be his wife and children who suffer most.
See, for example, Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144
U Pa L Rev 2055, 2075 (1996) (describing an Ohio case where publishing the name of a
man caught soliciting a prostitute caused even greater public humiliation for his wife),
citing John Hopkins, Publishing Names of 'Johns' Punishes Families, Wife Says, Cin Enq
BI (Apr 18, 1996); Woolner, Am Law at 35 (cited in note 9) (concluding that the "problem
with shaming is that its hard to judge the side-effects"). However, if shaming penalties
are imposed on offenders who would otherwise go to prison, the spillover effects of shame
may be no greater than those of imprisonment. Compare Massaro, 89 Mich L Rev at 1938
(cited in note 41) (suggesting that "[expanded use of public shaming surely would deliver
more convincing blows" to third parties than conventional punishment).
' See Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 636-37 (cited in note 31).
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the next."° But these differential effects are not ordinarily
thought to render imprisonment problematic on proportionality
grounds.
Rather than gauging proportionality by the emotional reac-
tions of individual offenders, Kahan argues that it should be
gauged by the social meaning of the sanction-i.e., by its ability
to express, and the degree to which it expresses, moral condem-
nation. Because expressive meaning is a social phenomenon, it
can be evaluated without taking into account a particular of-
fender's psychological propensity to experience shame."' While
not as easy to measure as dollars or time, getting a handle on so-
cial meaning may nonetheless be easier than guessing the emo-
tional and psychological effects of a particular sanction on a par-
ticular offender. Feeling shame is one thing. Being shamed is an-
other. Shame's defenders insist proportionality analysis should
focus on meanings and not feelings.
All the same, shame presents a major challenge to retribu-
tivist notions of proportionality. Comparing one offense to an-
other and ranking them from top to bottom in order to fix the
moral seriousness side of the proportionality equation is hard
enough. Adding shame to the mix of possible punishments intro-
duces variability and complexity to the severity side of the equa-
tion that at least some retributivists will want to avoid.8"
2. Deterrence.
In theory, it makes perfect sense to think that shame can be
an effective deterrent, both specifically and generally. Criminal
sanctions can forestall future wrongdoing either (in the language
of economic analysts) by raising the cost of committing the of-
fense (specific and general deterrence), or by inducing a change in
the potential offender's preference, or "taste," for crime.' The
former effect is direct. The latter, often referred to as the "moral-
izing" influence of the criminal law, is indirect and more diffuse.
This is especially true of offenders with high reputations to lose. See, for example,
Sol Wachtler, After the Madness: A Judge's Own Prison Memoir (Random House 1997)
(memoir of former chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, who was convicted of
harassment).
8 See Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 648 (cited in note 31). Compare Massaro, 89 Mich L
Rev at 1939 (cited in note 41) ("The 'cultural meaning of shame' is exceedingly amorphous,
if indeed one national meaning exists.").
"See von Hirsch, Censure at 62 (cited in note 64) ("The more numerous ... sanctions
are the more difficult and elusive the task of comparing severity becomes."). Retributivists
object to educating penalties on the same grounds. See note 238.
"See, for example, Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 638-39 (cited in note 31).
8 See Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U Pa L
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The former effect tends to make a criminal offense unattractive,
while the latter tends to make it unthinkable.
More speeffically, publicity and its potentially attendant
shame can deter wrongdoing in three ways.' First, they impose,
although to a comparatively limited or even trivial degree, some
limitation on the offender's freedom. He must, for example, stand
in public wearing a sign or abide by some similar restriction. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, they produce (if they work) an un-
pleasant emotional experience for the offender, which potential
offenders will want to avoid and actual offenders will want to
avoid repeating.' Third, depending on the nature of his commu-
Rev 949, 950 (1966) ('The 'messages' sent by law... contain factual information about
what would be risked by disobedience, but they also contain proclamations specifying that
it is wrong to disobey."); Gordon Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative,
Moralizing, and Habituative Effects, 1969 Wis L Rev 550, 555 ("[P]unisbment is a ritualis-
tic device designed to influence persons by intimating symbolically social disapproval and
society's moral condemnation."). See also Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon J. Hawkins, De-
terrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control 77-89 (Chicago 1973) (discussing the educa-
tive moral effect of criminal sanctions); Ronald L. Akers, Rational Choice, Deterrence, and
Social Learning Theory in Criminology: The Path Not Taken, 81 J Crim L & Crirninol 653,
655 (1990) (arguing that both effects are "subsumable under the more general differential
reinforcement formula in social learning theory"); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic
Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 Duke L J 1, 14-22 (pro-
viding an economic analysis of the criminal law's moralizing influence).
For empirical assessments of this effect, see, for example, Nigel Walker and Catherine
Marsh, Do Sentences Affect Public Disapproval, 24 Brit J Criminol 27, 41 (1984) (finding
that "peers' views and 'criminalisation' could, in some circumstances, affect disapproval"
but that "information about the sentence or about judicial disapproval" does not); Nigel
Walker and Michael Argyle, Does the Law Affect Moral Judgments?, 4 Brit J Criminol 570,
579 (1964) (finding "no significant differences . . . between those who were told that a
given type of conduct was a criminal offense and those who were told it was not").
' See Harold G. Grasmick and Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disap-
proval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J Crim L & Criminol 325,
334 (1980) (discussing an empirical study finding that legal sanctions, social disapproval,
and moral commitment can explain about 40 percent of the variance in variables used to
measure "illegal behavior").
" See Harold G. Grasmick and Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others,
and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 L & Society Rev 837, 853-54
(1990) (discussing an empirical study finding "strong evidence of a deterrent effect of
shame" with respect to tax cheating, theft, and drunk driving). See also Harold G. Gras-
mick, Robert J. Bursik, Jr., and Karyl A. Kinsey, Shame and Embarrassment as Deter-
rents to Noncompliance with the Law: The Case of an Antilittering Campaign, 23 Envir &
Beh 233, 248 (1991) (discussing an empirical study of antilittering campaign and con-
cluding that "threats of shame and embarrassment significantly reduced the reported in-
clination to litter"); Stephen G. Tibbets, Shame and Rational Choice in Offending Deci-
sions, 24 Crim Just & Beh 234, 245 (1997) (discussing an empirical study finding that
"E[shame states due to exposure had negative effect on intentions to shoplift but had no
significant effect on intentions to drive drunk' and that "shame states without exposure
had inhibitory effects on intentions to commit both offenses"). But see Harold G. Gras-
mick, et al, Changes in Perceived Threats of Shame, Embarrassment, and Legal Sanctions
for Interpersonal Violence, 1982-1992, 8 Violence & Victims 313, 323 (1993) (discussing an
empirical study concluding that "respondents in 1992 experience[d] no greater pain of
19981
The University of Chicago Law Review
nal attachments, he may suffer adverse consequences from mem-
bers of the community, who may gossip about him or refuse to
engage in various forms of social and economic intercourse with
him.87 If shaming penalties can successfully impose all these
costs, they should in principle make effective deterrents.s' Add to
this the moralizing effects of widespread publicity of offenders'
wrongdoing, and shame promises to be a useful ally on the side of
order-and, compared to imprisonment, a cheaper ally, too.
Doubts about the deterrent power of shame track those re-
lated to shame and proportionality. As for specific deterrence,
when shame does work, it may ironically push an offender into
greater criminality. Rather than simply shame him, the penalty
may "stigmatize" or "label" him a "criminal."89 And if an offender
comes to identify himself as a "criminal," the result may be more
crime, since crime is what "criminals" do. Of course, the stigma-
tizing effect of shaming penalties may be no more dramatic than
those of a stint, however short, in prison.' Conversely, when
shaming doesn't work, it may be because the offender is so so-
cially alienated and disaffected that he is already at risk of en-
gaging in criminal activity. Under these circumstances the deter-
shame or remorse for physically hurting someone on purpose than did respondents in
1982").
See Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J L
& Econ 519, 540 (1996) (concluding that "[g]overnment stigmatization is extremely impor-
tant, but its purpose is really to provide the private sector with the raw materials for a
more efficient way of dealing with offenders").
Shaming penalties also may reduce crime insofar as they increase private monitor-
ing of an offender; that is, third parties who would suffer spillover stigma from the publi-
cation of his wrongdoing, such as family members, may work harder to keep him in line.
See, for example, Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 643 n 215 (cited in note 31).
See Edwin M. Lemert, Social Pathology 318-19 (McGraw-Hill 1951) (discussing so-
ciological notion of "secondary deviance"); Charles R. Tittle, Sanctions and Social Devi-
ance: The Question of Deterrence 177-78 (Praeger 1980) (discussing "labeling" or "societal
reaction theory); David A. Ward and Charles P. Tittle, deterrence or labeling: the effects of
informal sanctions, 14 Deviant Beh 43, 44-45 (1991) (discussing "labeling approach"). See
also David R. Karp, The Judicial and Judicious Use of Shame Penalties, 44 Crime & De-
linquency 277, 284 (1998) ("The result of this shaming process is labeling and, worse, ex-
clusion from the community."); Posner, Shaming Penalties at 13-14 (cited in note 56) (ar-
guing that shaming penalties can create "deviant subcommunities").
See Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 645 (cited in note 31). The problem of stigmatization
might, as Kahan suggests, be ameliorated if shaming rituals were accompanied by "rein-
tegration" rituals, i.e., rituals that formally "restore status to the offender after marking
his conduct as deviant." Id. See also John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration
55 (Cambridge 1989) (arguing that "stigmatization," unlike "reintegrative shaming," "di-
vides the community by creating a class of outcasts"); John Braithwaite and Stephen Mug-
ford, Conditions of Successful Reintegration Ceremonies: Dealing with Juvenile Offenders,
34 Brit J Criminol 139, 143 (1994) (identifying fourteen conditions of successful "reinte-
gration ceremonies"). Extant shaming penalties typically lack such rituals. See Massaro, 3
Psych, Pub Pal, & L at 694 (cited in note 30).
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rent impact of shame may be negligible.9' In reality, however, the
number of such completely disaffected and therefore shameless
people is probably smaller than one might think.2
As for general deterrence, much depends on the nature of the
relevant community. At one extreme, a community may be so at-
omized that no one cares very much about what anyone thinks of
anyone else, in which case that particular association of persons
hardly deserves to be called a community in the first place. 3
Shame is unlikely to play a significant role in the social life of so
thin an association. At the other extreme, the self may be unable
to conceive of itself independent of its attachments to the com-
munity," in which case shame may be a powerful regulator in so-
cial life, squeezing out the need for any legal regulation or formal
sanctions altogether.95 The truth lies somewhere in between and
varies from community to community. All else being equal, how-
ever, shaming penalties are likely to be more effective in Kenosha
than they are in Manhattan. This is not to say they will be wholly
ineffective in Manhattan,96 only that we should expect less.
All of this is highly speculative. Some judges who regularly
impose shaming penalties insist that it deters just as well as, if
not better than, the alternative sanction,97 which usually means
prison. Still, no one knows for certain. Shaming penalties are too
new, and, as Kahan says, no one has yet subjected them to sys-
" See, for example, Karp, 44 Crime & Delinquency at 291 ("[B]ecause shaming is
predicated on the offender's stake in conventional society, it is not likely to be effective for
individuals already on the margins."). The risk of underdeterrence could, of course, be ad-
dressed by combining shame with other sanctions, including short stints of imprisonment.
See Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 641 (cited in note 31).
"See John Braithwaite, Shame and Modernity, 33 Brit J Criminol 1, 2 (1993) (argu-
ing that the "nature of interdependencies in modem urban social relations can actually in-
crease rather than decrease our exposure to shame").
"In fact, the decline of shaming penalties in colonial America has been attributed to
increasing doubts about their power to deter, which in turn is usually attributed to the
weakening of communal ties associated with the colonies' increasing, and increasingly
mobile, population. See, for example, Hirsch, Rise of the Penitentiary at 38 (cited in note 5)
("[T]he threat of a session on the pillory was less daunting when performed before persons
with whom offenders were unacquainted, and with whom they need have no further per-
sonal contact.").
" See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 150 (Cambridge 1982)
(describing this "communitarian" conception of the self).
"See, for example, Massaro, 89 Mich L Rev at 1904-17 (cited in note 41) (examining
cultures that rely heavily on informal sanctions).
"For example, imagine Leona Helmsley in stocks in Central Park for tax evasion. See
Mona Charen, For the Likes of Helmsley, The Stocks, Newsday 46 (Dec 18, 1989) (making
this suggestion).
"See, for example, Ted Poe, Public Humiliation is Effective Deterrent, Dallas Morning
News 31A (Apr 11, 1997) (statement by major judicial practitioner of shaming penalties on
their effectiveness).
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tematic empirical inquiry." The most one can say for now is that
shaming penalties can deter some offenders some of the time,
even if they don't deter optimally."°° Under the right circum-
stances, for example, posting the phone numbers and names of
slumlords outside their below-code properties can probably be a
very effective way to enlist the deterrent (and remedial) power of
shame.'0 ' Similarly, some communities that publicize the names
of men who solicit prostitutes report that the number of prosti-
tutes on the city's streets declined noticeably,0 2 although these
reports are mixed.' °
3. Rehabilitation.
Although it has fallen from favor,"4 rehabilitation remains
among the traditional justifications for punishment, and the pos-
sibility that shame can rehabilitate has been noted as a source of
its appeal.15 The courts, however, have searched in vain for
Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 638 (cited in note 31).
See, for example, Massaro, 3 Psych, Pub Pal, & L at 695 (cited in note 30) ("[IUt
would be silly [to suggest] ... that properly crafted, context-sensitive shame penalties
can't ever deter misconduct in any modem context."); Whitman, 107 Yale L J at 1068
(cited in note 49) ("Shame sanctions are likely to work in the ways in which they are ap-
plied, even in a modem, western, urban society.").
1
"See Posner, Shaming Penalties at 2 (cited in note 56) ("[S]haming penalties are
likely to produce arbitrary levels of punishment... resulting in arbitrary levels of deter-
rence.").
"'See, for example, Eveld, Shame makes a comeback, Kan City Star at Al (cited in
note 14) (reporting that, of four landlords threatened with a shaming sign, two fixed their
property immediately, and the other two fixed their property soon after signs went up on
another landlord's property); Larrabee, Fighting crime, USA Today at 3A (cited in note 12)
(reporting similar success in Framingham, Massachusetts).
"See Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 640 (cited in note 31) (noting that La Mesa, Califor-
nia officials report fewer prostitutes on the streets since the city began publishing the
names of patrons). See also Timothy Heider, 'John TV credited with cutting crimes, Kan
City Star C12 (Nov 28, 1997) (noting that solicitation has dropped by one-third since the
show aired in May); Phil Garlington, 'John TV' helps merchants sweep strip, Orange
County Reg A37 (Oct 12, 1997) (quoting Stockton police spokesman as saying "our anecdo-
tal report from officers is that the number of prostitutes on the street has dropped off").
"See, for example, Persons, Note, 49 Vand L Rev at 1543 & n 95 (cited in note 12)
(citing examples of the ineffectiveness of shaming).
"See generally Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy
and Social Purpose 1-2 (Yale 1981) (noting that "[iln the course of a decade, perhaps less,
the rehabilitative ideal suffered a precipitous decline in its capacity to influence American
penal practice").
"See Massaro, 89 Mich L Rev at 1895 (cited in note 41) ("Shaming therefore can be
justified under rehabilitation theory, provided that the evidence, which is not yet avail-
able, bears out that this 'rehabilitation' in fact influences behavior."); Whitman, 107 Yale
L J at 1067-68 (cited in note 49) (noting that shame may work on. first-time offenders as
"liminal rites, rites that warn first and minor offenders that they are flirting with a deep,
and deeply undesirable, status change?).
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shame's rehabilitative potential."w
For example, in one recent case, People v Meyer,"7 the Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the shaming sanction imposed on Glenn
Meyer, who had been convicted of aggravated battery."ce The trial
court sentenced Meyer to thirty months probation, and among
other things, required him to post a large sign at the entry to his
property stating, "Warning! A Violent Felon lives here. Enter at
your own risk."1°" Although the court recognized that the sign
might punish Meyer, and might put anyone who entered his
property on notice that he could be dangerous, Illinois's law re-
quired probation conditions to serve some plausible rehabilitative
function, which according to the court, the sign did not."
The Illinois court was following the lead of courts in Tennes-
see and New York. In State v Burdin," the Tennessee Supreme
Court also found shame and rehabilitation to be at odds. Wayne
Burdin had pled guilty to sexual battery."' The trial court sus-
pended Burdin's one-year sentence and placed him on two years
of probation, with the condition that he place in his front yard a
"four-by-eight foot sign with black letters over a yellow back-
ground stating: 'Warning, all children. Wayne Burdin is an ad-
mitted and convicted child molester.""' However, according to
the Tennessee Supreme Court, the purpose of a probationary sen-
tence was rehabilitation." Because the court was skeptical of the
rehabilitative potential in requiring Burdin to announce his of-
fense on a sign in his front yard, the court held the sentence to be
invalid. 11
5
"'When shaming penalties are imposed as a condition of probation, they frequently
escape judicial review. Because the offender agrees to the condition, he usually makes no
effort to challenge it on appeal. See Neil P. Cohen and James J. Gobert, The Law of Proba-
tion and Parole § 5.08 at 207-08 (Shepard's 1983) ("Since most offenders are delighted to
receive probation or parole and have agreed to, or at least acquiesced in, the conditions
imposed, they rarely litigate the validity of the conditions.").
' 186 Ill 2d 372, 680 NE2d 315 (1997).
' Id at 320.
'"Id at 316.
" Id at 320 (holding the punishment of posting the sign to be inconsistent with proba-
tion statute insofar as it was designed to humiliate rather than rehabilitate the offender).
The court also invalidated the condition on the ground that the "sign may have unpredict-
able or unintended consequences which may be inconsistent with the rehabilitative pur-
pose of probation." Id.
"'.924 SW2d 82 (Tenn 1996).
"'Id at 83-84.
..Id at 84. Although Burdin "essentially stood mute" when the court imposed the con-
dition, he objected to it on appeal. The Tennessee Supreme Court entertained his objec-
tion, despite the fact he did not object during sentencing, under a Tennessee procedural
rule allowing it to review any error "at any time where necessary to do justice.' Id.
"'Id at 86 ("The primary goal of probation... is the rehabilitation of the defendant.").
"'Id at 87.
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The New York Court of Appeals reached a similar conclu-
sion."6 Roy Letterlough pled guilty to driving while under the in-
fluence, his sixth alcohol-related driving offense in the last
twenty years.1 7 As part of a plea agreement, his license was re-
voked, and he was sentenced to five years of probation."' If, how-
ever, the Department of Motor Vehicles decided to restore his li-
cense at any time during the probationary period, Letterlough
was required to put on his car a fluorescent sign that read,
"CONVICTED DWI."" 9 Describing the "overriding purpose" of
probation to be the offender's rehabilitation, 2 ° and finding that
the sign was punitive, not rehabilitative, the New York Court of
Appeals invalidated the condition.'2'
Not all courts see things this way. The Florida intermediate
courts, for example, have looked more favorably upon modern-day
scarlet letters. The reasoning of the Florida courts, however, rests
on a simple confusion. In Goldschmitt v State,"2 Goldschmitt had
been convicted of DUI, and, like Letterlough in New York, had
been required to post a "CONVICTED D.U.I.-RESTRICTED
LICENSE" sign on his car."2' The court upheld the condition, rea-
soning that the "deterrent, and thus the rehabilitative, effect of
punishment may be heightened if it 'inflicts disgrace and contu-
mely in a dramatic and spectacular fashion," 1"4 which it thought
the sign did."
"'See People u Letterlough, 86 NY2d 259, 655 NE2d 146, 146 (1995).
... Id at 147.
"'Id. The sign was also easily removable, thereby reducing some of the spillover
stigma. See id. The defendant's failure to object to the condition did not prevent the ap-
pellate court from reviewing the condition, because it "involve[d] the essential nature of
the right to be sentenced as provided by law." Id at 148 n 1 (citation and internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
""Id at 148.
12, Id at 151 ("[Tjhe 'convicted dwi' sign ... cannot under any view be regarded as a re-
habilitative measure authorized by [the state's] Penal Law."). The court also noted that, if
preventing an offender from driving while intoxicated was the aim of the condition, re-
quiring an "ignition interlock device" plausibly could accomplish that end without shame.
Id.
"490 S2d 123 (Fla Dist Ct App 1986).
"Id at 124.
" Id at 125 (emphasis added), quoting United States v William Anderson Co, Inc, 698
F2d 911, 913 (8th Cir 1983). See also Lindsay v State, 606 S2d 652, 656 (Fla Dist Ct App
1992). The Florida Supreme Court has yet to review shaming penalties.
The Georgia courts also have approved shaming penalties. See Ballenger v State, 436
SE2d 793, 794 (Ga Ct App 1993) (upholding probation condition requiring DUI offender to
wear a "fluorescent pink bracelet imprinted with the words 'D.U.I. CONVICT"). The Bal-
lenger court, like the Goldschmitt court, elided the distinction between rehabilitation and
specific deterrence. See id at 794-95.
"See Goldschmitt, 490 S2d at 126.
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But this reasoning confuses specific deterrence and rehabili-
tation. The difference between the two, which the Florida court
ignored, turns not on whether a particular sanction can stop an
offender from offending again in the future, but why he refrains
from offending. Specific deterrence forestalls future offenses by
changing the offender's cost-benefit calculus. Rehabilitation, on
the other hand, forestalls future offenses by changing the defen-
dant's preferences. The specifically deterred offender now knows
what it feels like to be punished, and out of fear, avoids making
the same mistake twice. The rehabilitated offender, in contrast,
now knows and accepts that what he did was wrong, and out of
respect for the law and the rights of others, no longer thinks it is
morally tolerable to violate either of them. The distinction can be
elusive, but it is important nonetheless.
Shaming penalties can specifically deter, but, as the courts of
New York and Illinois have recognized, their power to rehabili-
tate is more questionable. Insofar as a particular offender is
"shame-able," he will, having once experienced that unpleasant
emotion, fear experiencing it again and so might refrain from fu-
ture wrongdoing. If this is "rehabilitation," it is rehabilitation in
the most minimal sense and really amounts to nothing more than
"Pavlovian conditioning."126
C. Is Shame Undignified?
Despite the difficulties shaming penalties face on retributiv-
ist, deterrence, and rehabilitative grounds, even critics of shame
seem hard-pressed to dismiss such penalties entirely on those
grounds alone.'27 Another objection, however, questions whether
shame respects the limits that any morally respectable punish-
ment should respect. Yet, here too, the answer is unclear.
1. Dignity.
Shaming penalties are, for example, said to be cruel, de-
grading, demeaning, humiliating, or otherwise generally inhu-
mane." At some point, these objections blur together. At the risk
1
"'Goldschmitt, 490 S2d at 125-26.
1
"See, for example, Massaro, 89 Mich L Rev at 1900 (cited in note 41) ("The traditional
theories of punishment suggest that all of the shaming sanctions can be justified under
one or several of the basic theories").
'"See, for example, Massaro, 3 Psych, Pub Pol, & L at 703 (cited in note 30)
("[Pisychological works on shame ... analyze closely how shaming may convey contempt,
and result in humiliation rather than shame."); Massaro, 89 Mich L Rev at 1936-43 (cited
in note 41) (arguing that shaming penalties are especially likely to violate "humaneness
factors").
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of oversimplification, we can perhaps safely reduce them to the
basic idea that shaming penalties violate an offender's dignity,
which no morally decent state should do. 9
But figuring out just what limits dignity places on punish-
ment is not easy. All forms of punishment are to some degree de-
grading." How else could they convey their condemnatory mes-
sage? Perhaps the most we can say is that morally respectable
forms of punishment maintain a delicate balance between legiti-
mate condemnation and illegitimate degradation.'' Torture
plainly falls on the degrading side of the line, but where shaming
penalties fall is harder to say.
According to Toni Massaro, a powerful critic of shaming pen-
alties, "[s]tate-enforced shaming authorizes public officials to
search for and destroy or damage an offender's dignity."' 2 Ac-
cording to Andrew von Hirsch, a proponent of "just deserts" but
an opponent of shame, the stocks and pillory may be the classic
examples of illegitimate "demeaning rituals," but forcing offend-
ers to "attach self-accusing bumper-stickers to their vehicles" and
other forms of "compulsory attitudinalizing" should also be ruled
out on grounds of dignity.'33
In a recent and exceptionally thoughtful essay, James Whitman tries to pinpoint ex-
actly what is wrong with imposing shame sanctions. According to Whitman, shaming
sanctions risk "nudg[ing] prevailing public views in a new, and more moralistic direction,"
tend to transform the public into a "mob, or collection of petty private prison guards," and
involve a "troubling tolerance for ochlocracy [that is, government by mob], for a democratic
government too susceptible to the pitch and yaw of mob psychology." Whitman, 107 Yale L
J at 1089 (cited in note 49). Together, these effects threaten what Whitman calls an of-
fender's "transactional dignity," which he describes as a "deeply rooted norm of our society
that persons should never be forced to deal with wild or unpredictable partners." Id at
1090.
'"See Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society 262 (Harvard 1996) (Naomi Goldblum,
trans) ("[A] society is a decent one if it punishes its criminals-even the worst of them-
without humiliating them."). See also Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 100 (1957) (describing the
Eighth Amendments ban on cruel and unusual punishments as resting on "nothing less
than the dignity of man").
'" Indeed, the entire criminal process can be understood as a series of "status degrada-
tion ceremonies." See Braithwaite and Mugford, 34 Brit J Criminol at 141 (cited in note
90) ("Most criminal trials are good examples of status degradation ceremonies."); Joseph
Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions
in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L J 543, 590 (1960) (The criminal process, from
arrest through release, is comprised of a series of "status degradation ceremonies.").
... See Hampton, Expressive Theory at 14 (cited in note 33) ("Hence the construction of
retributive punishment is an art, which involves the satisfaction of two demands: first,
that the wrongdoer be diminished; and second, that the diminishment not represent him
as lower in value than the victim"); von Hirsch, Censure at 82 (cited in note 64) ('The an-
swer lies in the difference between censure and attempts to humiliate.").
"'Massaro, 89 Mich L Rev at 1943 (cited in note 41).
" See von Hirsch, Censure at 83 (cited in note 64).
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Defenders of shaming penalties, including Kahan, recognize
the risk such sanctions pose for human dignity and the need for
some limits. They don't urge a wholesale return to the full pano-
ply of colonial punishments. Public whipping, for example, is out
of the question." Nor do they urge municipalities to invest in the
construction of public stocks and pillories reminiscent of puritan
Massachusetts.- s
Still, I think that some contemporary shaming penalties do
cross--or come close to crossing-the line. For example, fed up
with juvenile delinquency, the town of Dermott, Arkansas passed
a city ordinance under which the parents of delinquents would be
"placed within stockaded public display six hours a day," though
not for more than "two consecutive days."' By almost any ac-
count, public display within a stockade would come close to, if not
step over, the line, as would forcing an offender who was "acting
like a baby" to wear a diaper over his regular clothing.3 '
But shame's defenders endorse more modest measures, like
signs, newspaper advertisements, public speeches, and public
apologies. Whether these forms of shame go too far is debatable.
"See Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 617 (cited in note 31) (arguing that corporal punish-
ment is politically unacceptable because the message it conveys is that "offenders are the
natural or social inferiors of those who discipline them"). Compare Graeme Newman, Just
and Painful: A Case for the Corporal Punishment of Criminals 41-49 (Macmillan 2d ed
1995) (arguing that corporal punishment in the form of graduated electric shocks is the
"fairest punishment of all"); Kan, 25 J Legal Stud at 130 (cited in note 21) (advocating use
of electric shock to incapacitate "offending organs").
"Such devices might be held unconstitutional today. See Goldschmitt, 490 S2d at 125
(indicating that pillory would be cruel and unusual punishment but distinguishing DWI
bumper sticker from the "degrading physical rigors of the pillory"), citing Hobbs v State,
133 Ind 404, 32 NE 1019, 1021 (1893) (wCruer ... meant... such as that inflicted at the
whipping post, in the pillory, breaking on the wheel, etc.'); State v Moilen, 140 Minm 112,
167 NW 345, 346 (1918) (finding that the legislature decides penalties and that they "must
stand however harsh it may seem to those who run counter to its commands'); State v Ge-
dicke, 43 NJL 86, 96 (NJ Sup Ct 1881) (holding that it was not cruel and unusual punish-
ment to impose both a fine and imprisonment).
Imagine, however, a moder-day pillory located near the local courthouse in which the
openings for the arms and head were fully padded and in which the offender was required
to spend only an hour at high noon. Imagine also that a canvas awning shades the of-
fender from the sun and a plexiglass screen protects him from any possible projectiles
launched by the crowd or passers-by. Would such a modified pillory materially differ from
requiring an offender to stand on the courthouse steps for the same period of time wearing
a sandwich-board that announced his crime?
"'Not surprisingly, the stockade was never built. See Suzanne Fields, Going After the
Parents, Wash Times F1 (Aug 15, 1989); Resurrecting the Stockade: Town plans to use
public shame to fight lawlessness, St. Petersburg Times 3A (Aug 9, 1989); Town Beset By
Delinquents Moves to Pillory Parents, The Record A18 (Aug 13, 1989).
"See Bienz v State, 343 S2d 913, 914-15 (Fla 1977) (holding that an order issued by
halfway house "therapist coordinator' that probationer "wear diapers on the outside of his
pants' would be "demeaning' in the "minds of... reasonable men' and the violation
thereof could not form basis for revoking probation).
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Moreover, shame's defenders make a powerful comparative point:
If the alternative to shame is imprisonment, then at worst,
shame simply substitutes one set of indignities for another.'38
And, at best, shame saves offenders from a far greater indignity.
Indeed, perhaps the only saving grace of prison's indignities is
that the rest of us need not bear witness.
Comparing the indignity of prison with that of shaming pen-
alties is complicated, however, because the social meaning of
prison is ambiguous. On the one hand, prison means the depriva-
tion of liberty.'39 Inmates are intentionally subjected to a daily
routine not of their own choosing, and they lack many of the basic
liberties the rest of us take for granted. If this abstract account is
what we have in mind when we talk about imprisonment, then it
makes sense to claim, as some do, that "a person can endure the
deprivation of... liberties with dignity."40 With this mild vision
in mind, perhaps imprisonment is better than shame at honoring
dignity.
For Kahan, however, this vision is Pollyanish. Imprison-
ment, we all know, typically includes deprivations that extend far
beyond the simple deprivation of liberty. The grimy and some-
times harsh living conditions, along with the omnipresent risk
of violence,' all too often represent the reality-and indignity-
of daily life in prison. The benign phrase "deprivation of liberty"
looks much less respectful of human dignity if the image we have
in mind is one of inmates "caged like animals." From this Real-
politik perspective, evaluating which is more "undignified"-
prison or public shaming-will depend on the details. A week's
stay in some local county jails or minimum security facilities may
be more dignified than standing for two hours on the courthouse
steps for several days in a row wearing a sign describing one's of-
fense. On the other hand, time in a maximum security state
prison, no matter how short, may make that same two hour stint
look benign by comparison.
"'See Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 646 (cited in note 31) ("I]mprisonment... adds a
grotesque variety of indignities shaming cannot hope to rival.").
"'See, for example, von Hirsch, Censure at 84 (cited in note 64) ("Imprisonment should
be imposed as punishment but not for punishment.").
.Id at 82.
"' See Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 646-49 (cited in note 31).
".See Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison 1965-Present, in Norval Morris and
David J. Rothman, eds, The Oxford History of the Prison 249 (Oxford 1995).
"See generally Michael C. Braswell, Reid Montgomery, and Lucien X Lomardo, eds,
Prison Violence in America (Anderson 2d ed 1994) (analyzing different dimensions of
prison violence).
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But shame's proponents have a strategy that allows them to
bypass complicated and controversial debates about the nature of
human dignity, and the comparative indignities of prison and
shame. The basic strategy, examined below, relies on the norma-
tive power of consent.
2. Consent.
Shaming penalties are seldom imposed as independent, free-
standing sanctions. Instead, they are usually imposed as a "spe-
cial" condition of probation or a suspended sentence. Conse-
quently, most offenders subject to shaming penalties usually
agree to them in order to get probation.'" If so, how can anyone
complain?
From the offender's perspective, shame is plainly the lesser
of two evils. Consent, so the argument goes, pulls the rug out
from under dignity-based objections to shame." 5 After all, isn't
free will, the source of our power to consent, one of the founda-
tions of human dignity, even if human dignity is not reducible to
consent?4 6 If so, then shame's defenders can fight fire with fire,
drawing on one strand of dignity to offset objections based on an-
other.
But this strategy raises a problem. Consent is valid only if it
is uncoerced. But in order to know whether or not consent is co-
erced, we need to know the relevant baseline. That is, what's the
alternative to the "chosen" option? Offenders who elect shame
usually do so because the baseline-what they will get if they re-
fuse to accept shame-is in fact imprisonment. From this per-
spective, shame looks like an offer most offenders would be silly
to refuse. Indeed, most offenders don't refuse. 47 Most take the
shame.48
'" Of course, not all shaming penalties are based on consent. In Pennsylvania, for ex-
ample, courts are required to publish the name and sentence of anyone twice convicted of
soliciting a prostitute "in a newspaper of general circulation in the judicial district in
which the court sits." See 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5902(eX2) (Purdon 1996).
'"See Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 647 (cited in note 31) ("ilt is... either confused or
disingenuous... to say that one of the reasons to disregard offenders' [choice of shame
over prison] is to spare them from cruelty."). But see Massaro, 3 Psych, Pub Pol, & L at
699 (cited in note 30) ("[Olne may read the choice of shaming over prison as evidence that
both are horrible prospects, but that prison imposes the double cost of stigma and liberty
deprivation. Shaming does look bad; its just that prison looks worse."). Compare von
Hirsch, Censure at 81 (cited in note 64) (arguing that "a penal measure needs to be justi-
fied in its own right, not merely by comparison with another, possibly worse measurer).
"See R. George Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Dignity Non-
Coercively, 75 BU L Rev 1397, 1398 (1995) ("Making legal rights and duties contingent on
consent usually serves human dignity.").
"See Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 641 (cited in note 31) ("[O]ffenders typically opt for
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However, this approach to the issue of consent relies on the
status quo to fix the baseline.49 But why should that be so? Why
isn't some "lesser" sanction the appropriate baseline? For exam-
ple, if the punishment for an offender who "consents" to shame
should be straight probation and not imprisonment then what
looks like an offer is in fact a threat, and the offender's consent to
shame is coerced and thus invalid. In order for consent to consti-
tute a full defense of shame, what's needed is an argument that
imprisonment is the morally appropriate default option. Propo-
nents of shame have yet to make this argument.
Indeed, one might think shame's proponents are making pre-
cisely the opposite argument: Prison is not the "appropriate"
sanction for many offenders. Shame is. But if shame is the "ap-
propriate" sanction for an offender-because prison is too harsh,
and probation is too lenient-then offenders who "choose" shame
over incarceration have indeed been coerced by the threat of im-
prisonment, even if judges are legally authorized to make that
threat.150
I. THE EDUCATING MODEL
The shaming model begins with the expressive dimension of
punishment and emphasizes shame's greater power to condemn
an offender's wrongdoing compared with other alternative sanc-
tions. Shame is then justified on the familiar grounds of retribu-
tion, deterrence, and rehabilitation. The alternative to shame is
the educating model, which in many ways represents a more ap-
pealing approach to the problem of punishment.
shame over imprisonment when given the choice.").
"But not all. See, for example, Meg Jones, Woman Chooses Jail Instead of Shaming,
Milwaukee J Sent 1 (May 23, 1997) (A woman convicted of welfare fraud opted for fifteen
days in jail over a sixteen hour stint wearing sign on courthouse steps.).
"'See Alan Wertheimer, Coercion 206-11 (Princeton 1987) (discussing various base-
lines against which the existence of coercion can be gauged).
"
0 Moreover, at least under existing law, consent faces a legal problem. The problem
stems from the traditional "rehabilitative" aim of probation. Where shaming penalties are
imposed as a condition of probation, they must under many statutory schemes be reasona-
bly related to the offender's rehabilitation. See, for example, Cohen and Gobert, The Law
of Probation and Parole § 5.01 at 182 (cited in note 106) ("By statute or judicial decision,
virtually every jurisdiction supports the proposition that rehabilitation is at least one of
the goals which probation.. . conditions should serve."). Under existing law, therefore,
shame's proponents often must accept the bitter with the sweet. If they wish to defend
shame as a consented-to condition of probation, they must explain how shame can reha-
bilitate. For their part, the courts have been skeptical of shame's rehabilitative potential.
See notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
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A. Educating and Shaming Contrasted
Like the shaming model, the educating model has two di-
mensions-expressive and justificatory-but it differs from the
shaming model along both of these dimensions.
1. The expressive dimension.
Rather than simply expressing condemnation of the of-
fender's wrongdoing, as in the shaming model, punishment in the
educating model is seen as a mode of bilateral communication,
not just unilateral expression.' The shaming model likens pun-
ishment to a monologue in which the state expresses its disap-
proval and disavowal of the offender's wrongdoing. To stretch the
language metaphor still further, we might say punishment in the
shaming model is designed to "yell" at the offender, loud and
clear.
The educating model, in contrast, likens punishment to a
dialogue in which the state punishes the offender in order to
"wake him up," to get him to recognize and understand why what
he has done was wrong, and ideally, to repent. The aim is to get
the offender to reform himself. The dialogue is still a punitive
one, however, and not just a chat. But rather than simply "yell-
ing" at the offender, as in the shaming model, punishment in the
educating model is intended to speak to him so he will listen and
learn from what is said and not just passively receive our cen-
sure.
2. The justificatory dimension.
The educating model relies on what has been called the
moral education, or moral reform, theory of punishment to justify
the hardships it imposes." 2 This theory is distinct from retribu-
.., See R-AL Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punish-
ment, in Michael Tonry, ed, 20 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 1, 33 (1996) (dis-
tinguishing between expressing condemnation and communicating with offender). See also
RA Duff, Trials and Punishments 236 (Cambridge 1986) (stating that the goal of pun-
ishment is not merely condemnation but also bringing the offender to recognize the wrong-
fulness of his conduct); RA Duff, Alternatives to Punishment-or Alternative Punish-
ments?, in Wesley Cragg, ed, Retributivism and Its Critics 43, 51 (Steiner 1992) ("[Llaw it-
self should involve a communicative process between the state and the citizen, not merely
a one-way exercise of 'managerial contror by rulers over the ruled.), citing Lon Fuller,
The Morality of Law 207-13 (Yale 2d ed 1969); Antony Duff, Punishment, Expression and
Penance, in Heike Jung, Heinz Mouller-Dietz, and Ulfrid Neumann, eds, Recht und Moral
235, 239 (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1991).
"'For the best recent statements of this theory, see Duff, Trials at 233-66; Duff, 20
Crime and Justice at 1; Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13
Phil & Pub Aff 208 (1984); Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 Am
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tivism and utilitarianism on which the shaming model is based,
as well as from rehabilitation-although it shares affinities with
all of these traditional justifications. 113
Like utilitarianism (but unlike retributivism), the moral re-
form theory has a forward-looking aim: The goal of punishment
is, simply put, the offender's moral education or reform.M How-
ever, because the punishment inflicted on the offender is in-
tended to persuade him that his offense was wrong, the moral re-
form theory, unlike standard utilitarian approaches, requires
that the offender be treated as a responsible, autonomous agent-
as a being capable of rational address-and not merely as an ob-
ject to be manipulated through coercion and fear. Philosophically,
utilitarianism treats offenders not much differently from how a
trainer would treat a misbehaving dog.155 To the utilitarian way
of thinking, punishment appeals to the sense of pain. Under the
moral reform theory, punishment ideally makes its appeal to the
offender's reason.
Moreover, unlike traditional rehabilitative theory, which also
aims at the offender's transformation, the moral reform theory
seeks to accomplish this transformation in a distinctive way. It
seeks reform through punishment, not as an adjunct to punish-
ment. The mechanism of moral reform is punishment itself, not,
as in the traditional rehabilitative model, some therapeutic re-
Phil Q 263 (1981). See also Nozick, Philosophical Explanations at 370-74 (cited in note 33)
(articulating a version of moral reform theory but describing it as "teleological retributiv-
ism"). Compare John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or A Third "Model" of the
Criminal Process, 79 Yale L J 359, 389-90 (1970) (developing "Family Model" of criminal
process and identifying "educational impact" of that process as "central" to the model). For
earlier statements, see A.C. Ewing, The Morality of Punishment 73-125 (Patterson Smith
1970); Walter Moberly, The Ethics of Punishment 121-50 (Faber & Faber 1968).
1
"The moral reform theory is a "hybrid" theory of punishment inasmuch as it tries to
combine the insights of utilitarianism and retributivism. See Duff, 20 Crime and Justice
at 3 (cited in note 151) (arguing for theories that "give punishment an end beyond itself
but that... find in the nature of that end substantive constraints on the means by which
it may be pursued"). See also A.C. Ewing, Punishment as Moral Agency: An Attempt to
Reconcile the Retributive and the Utilitarian View, 36 Mind 292, 292 (1927) (suggesting
that the moral reform theory sets the "terms for a treaty of peace" between utilitarianism
and retributivism).
A hybrid theory of this sort should be distinguished from more familiar "mixed" theo-
ries of punishment, which either impose retributive side constraints on an otherwise utili-
tarian theory, see H.L.A. Hart, 60 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society at 8-12 (cited in
35), or allow utilitarian considerations to fix an offender's punishment within parameters
otherwise established by a retributive theory. See von Hirsch, Censure at 47 (cited in note
64). See generally Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law
92-94 (Clarendon 1997) (describing two forms of mixed theories of punishment).
"'Se Nozick, Philosophical Explanations at 371 (cited in note 33) (describing moral
reform theorists as "teleological retributivists").
"
MSee, for example, Hampton, 13 Phil & Pub Aff at 211 (cited in note 152).
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gime to which the offender is subject while he is being punished
(e.g., while he is imprisoned). In addition, the moral reform the-
ory does not embrace reform at all costs. It respects the offender's
autonomy insofar as the offender is free to reject or ignore pun-
ishment's educative message. It delivers its message and with-
draws. It does not insist on continuing to punish until the of-
fender has changed his ways, which was one of the main objec-
tions leveled against the old rehabilitative ideal."s In short, it
seeks education, not indoctrination.57
Finally, like retributivism (but unlike utilitarianism), the
moral reform theory prides itself on treating the offender as a re-
sponsible moral agent. Consequently, punishment must be pro-
portionate to the seriousness of the offense and must be such that
it respects her status as a rational agent, which disproportionate
or excessive punishments do not. Again, consistent with respect
for the offender's autonomy, the offender is free to reject or ignore
punishment's educative message. Punishment under the moral
reform theory does not seek simple submission." The offender
can choose to accept the lesson, or not.
In short, the educating model and the moral reform theory
conceive of punishment as a way to teach the offender how and
why his offense was wrong. Ideally, therefore, the theory contem-
plates the following sequence: The offender comes through pun-
ishment to recognize and understand the nature of his offense, to
experience guilt for what he has done, and finally, to repent his
wrongdoing and to seek to make amends.
3. Guilt versus shame.
The mention of guilt brings us to one final contrast. "Self-
conscious" emotions, which include pride, shame, guilt, and em-
barrassment, figure in both the shaming model and the educating
model, but the emotions on which they are based are different.
Insofar as the shaming model is actually built on the emotion
of shame,'59 it stands again in contrast to the educating model,
which is premised, if anything, on guilt and not shame."s° Shame
'"See, for example, Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal-Penal
Policy and Social Purpose 44-46 (Yale 1981) (discussing tension between penal rehabilita-
tionism and liberal principles of consent and voluntarism).
5See Duff, 20 Crime and Justice at 50 n 32 (cited in note 151).
See id at 46-47.
"In all fairness, proponents of the shaming model do not appear too terribly con-
cerned with the precise adverse emotional response punishment elicits, whether it is
shame, guilt, or what not, so long as it elicits some adverse reaction. See, for example,
Massaro, 89 Mich L Rev at 1901 n 99 (cited in note 41).
"For efforts to sort out the differences between shame and guilt, and between shame
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involves the idea of an audience; it is "connected with the thought
that eyes are upon one."'6' Guilt involves no such connection. The
aim of the educating model is to get the offender himself to un-
derstand why what he did was wrong, an understanding to which
the morally appropriate emotional response is guilt. The aim is
not, as in the shaming model, to shame him in the eyes of others.
Moreover, among the family of self-conscious emotions, guilt
enjoys at least two advantages over shame. First, shame and
guilt differ in scope. Shame is global.'62 A single act of wrongdoing
is taken to be representative of a person's entire identity. As a re-
sult, shame can be shattering to the self's identity. Guilt, unlike
shame, focuses on the individuars particular act of wrongdoing as
distinct from the person as a whole.
Second, and more importantly, shame and guilt differ in the
responses they typically elicit. Shame prompts one to hide, to
seek shelter from public view, or worse, to strike back at the
source of the shame in an effort at self-preservation." The
shamed self is thus either passive and helpless,"6 or enraged. In
contrast, guilt prompts the self to try to make amends for the
wrongdoing. Because guilt preserves some distance between the
self and its wrongful act, it enables the self to become active and
engaged in an effort to repair the damage the offense has
caused." Shame supplies no such motive to repair.
and guilt and other adverse self-conscious emotions, see, for example, William Ian Miller,
Humiliation chs 3-4 (Cornell 1993); Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt (cited in note 25);
Massaro, 3 Psych, Pub Pol, & L at 668-73 (cited in note 30).
... Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt at 53 (cited in note 25). Of course, the "thought that
eyes are upon one" does not exclude the possibility of experiencing shame when completely
alone. See id at 57-59 ("The person feeling shame feels exposed. he thinks of himself as
being seen through the eyes of another .... One may feel shame when quite alone.").
"See id at 89 ("[Fleelings of guilt are localized in a way in which feelings of shame are
not localized; they concern themselves with the wrong done, not with the kind of person
one thinks one is.").
"See June Price Tangney, et al, Shamed Into Anger? The Relation of Shame and
Guilt to Anger and Self-Reported Aggression, 62 J Personality & Soc Psych 669, 669 (1992)
(concluding that "shame-proneness was consistently correlated with anger arousal").
"'See Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt at 68 (cited in note 25) ("Thinking of herself as
being seen in a certain way has revealed her to herself as inferior to what she believed, as-
sumed, or hoped to be. As what is ultimately revealed is her lower standing she naturally
feels helpless and hopeless."); Janie Lindsay-Hartz, Contrasting Experiences of Shame and
Guilt, 27 Am Beh Sci 689, 698 (1984) (Shame produces an urge to "hide and get out of the
social realm" as well as "the sense of being small and exposed.").
"See Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt at 90 (cited in note 25) ("If feelings of guilt con-
centrate on the deed or omission then the thought that some repayment is due is in place
here as it is not in the case of shame."); Lindsay-Hartz, 27 Am Beh Sci at 699 (cited in note
164) ("In order to feel guilty, it is essential that we also take responsibiltiy for this viola-
tion."). See also Herbert Morris, The Decline of Guilt, 99 Ethics 62, 67 (1988) ("[I]n feeling
guilty, one ... feels obliged to confess, to make amends, to repair, and to restore.");
Sheldon Y, Zhang, Measuring Shaming in an Ethnic Context, 35 Brit J Criminol 248, 260
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Assuming shame and guilt do indeed differ in these ways,
then the state, if it tries to elicit any emotion when it punishes,
should try to elicit guilt and not shame. Of course, eliciting a par-
ticular emotional response from a particular offender is not an
exact science. Nonetheless, if the state aims at any such re-
sponse-and both the shaming and educating model presuppose
that it will-then it should be guilt."s
B. Educational Anxieties
The moral reform theory has in one form or another been
around for quite some time. According to some, its roots may ex-
tend back to Hegel, 6 ' and possibly to Plato," who insisted that
wrongdoing could only be the result of moral blindness or igno-
rance.1"9 Despite its impressive lineage, however, the moral re-
form theory has seldom been prominent in discussions of pun-
ishment's justification. 7 ° Why not?
(1995) (suggesting that influential theory linking "reintegrative shaming" to low crime
rates in certain cultures is really based on guilt, because guilt, as distinct from shame,
"involves feelings of regret and remorse").
'"See June Price Tangney, Recent Advances in the Empirical Study of Shame and
Guilt, 38 Am Beh Sci 1132, 1142 (1995) (concluding that a "range of empirical studies...
underscore that... shame may represent the darker side of moral affect, while guilt may
not be that bad after all"). See also RE. Lamb, Guilt, Shame, and Morality, 43 Phil &
Phenom Res 329, 342 (1983) (arguing that "the role of shame in morality is much more of
a logically peripheral sort of role than is the role of guilt, [and] that morality may suffer no
essential injury when the possibility of shame is removed, but the excision of guilt cuts off
its head").
"
1 See Hampton, 13 Phil & Pub Aff at 208 (cited in note 152), citing G.W.F. Hegel, The
Philosophy of Right 66-74 (first published 1821) (Oxford 1952) (T.M. Knox, trans). See also
J. Ellis McTaggart, Hegel's Theory of Punishment, 6 Intl J Ethics 479, 483 (1896) (arguing
that for Hegel punishment is inflicted so that the offender is "forced into recognizing as
valid the law which he has rejected in sinning, and so repent of his sin-really repent, and
not merely be frightened out of doing so").
'"See Hampton, 13 Phil & Pub Aff at 208 (cited in note 152), citing Plato, The Laws,
bks 5, 9. Compare Mary Margaret Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment 204-06 (California
1981).
'"See Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment at 178 ("Plato offers three different analyses of
the criminal disposition: that it is ignorant; that it is psychic disorder, that it is disease.").
'"Indeed, one of the theory's most important proponents went over to the retributivist
camp. Compare Hampton, 13 Phil & Pub Aff at 208 (cited in note 152) (endorsing moral
education), with Hampton, Expressive Theory at 1-2 (cited in note 33) (endorsing retribu-
tivism). A prominent defender of retributivism, however, went in the other direction.
Compare Morris, 52 Monist at 477-78 (cited in note 64) (endorsing retributivism), with
Morris, 18 Am Phil Q at 264 (cited in note 152) (endorsing moral education).
Hampton continued to recognize a connection between her earlier moral education
view and her latter-day retributivism. As she put it:
[The expressive view of retribution is beth a useful supplement to and foundation for
the moral education view, because it offers an explanation of what it is that punish-
ment is saying such that it could be taken to be a morally educative message. It is not
that pain teaches something about wrongness, but rather that it is symbolic of defeat
The University of Chicago Law Review
Basically, three anxieties account for the theory's second-
class citizenship. The first fixes on whether punishment is neces-
sary for moral education. The second deals with whether pun-
ishment, no matter who or what imposes it, can ever really be an
educational experience. The third focuses on the legitimacy of
trying to educate the wrongdoer when the educating entity is the
state.
1. Why punishment?
If the goal of the moral reform theory is ideally to enter into
a dialogue with the offender, to persuade him of the wrongfulness
of his conduct, and to get him voluntarily to repent his wrongdo-
ing, then wouldn't it be better simply to try to reason with him?
Or at most, to subject him to verbal denunciation or an ethics lec-
ture? Moreover, shouldn't his trial and conviction be enough to
convince him?"' Why go further and subject him to the hard
treatment of punishment?
For some theorists, condemnation, censure, or blame can be
adequately expressed through some sort of purely symbolic or
formal declaration. If hard treatment is justified, it must be on
nonexpressive grounds. Typically, those grounds are utilitarian.
On this view, therefore, hard treatment may say nothing that
could not be said in words or symbolic gestures alone, but it is
nonetheless needed as a "supplementary prudential disincen-
tive."172
For other theorists, actions speak louder than words. Hard
treatment, and that of the right sort, is needed to make sure the
condemnation is taken seriously.'3 The moral reform theory
that makes it a useful (but not the only) tool for moral education.
Hampton, Expressive Theory at 21 (cited in note 33).
...The trial may, of course, be part of the process of moral education. See Duf, Trials
at 115 (cited in note 151) ("The aim of a criminal trial is not merely to reach an accurate
judgement on the defendant's past conduct: it is to communicate and justify that judg-
ment-to demonstrate its justice-to him and to others.").172von Hirsch, Censure at 14 (cited in note 64) ("[W]ith the need for prevention elimi-
nated, there would no longer be a need for so ambitious, intrusive, and burdensome an in-
stitution as the criminal sanction."). See also Uma Narayan, Appropriate Response and
Preventive Benefits: Justifying Censure and Hard Treatment in Legal Punishment, 13 Ox-
ford J Legal Stud 166, 166 (1993) ("[A] compelling justification for legal hard-treatment
partly requires an appeal to crime prevention.").
"See John Kleinig, Punishment and Moral Seriousness, 25 Israel L Rev 401, 417
(1992) ("[Flor the most part our sensitivities are too dull, our hypocrisy too common, for
mere face-to-face blaming to make its point."); Primoratz, 64 Phil at 198-202 (cited in note
36) (explaining that criminals, lacking human sympathy, respond only to "the language of
self-interest," and that punishment "translates" condemnation into this language). See
also David E. Cooper, Hegel's Theory of Punishment, in ZJA- Pelczynski, ed, Hegel's Politi-
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takes a similar view. Hard treatment is necessary because pun-
ishment "serves as a penance which the criminal should ideally
come to will for himself."74 Ideally, a penance is a punishment
the wrongdoer accepts or imposes on himself in order to show his
victim and the wider community that he understands what he did
was wrong. So conceived, hard treatment is necessary in order to
express the offender's conviction that he seeks to reform himself,
to restore the communal bonds that his action destroyed or
threatened, and to regain his good standing in the community. 75
Moreover, hard treatment can reinforce repentance by concen-
trating the mind and forcing the offender to attend to his wrong-
doing. 6 Formal denunciation, while important, is simply not
enough.
2. Can punishment educate?
Hard treatment may be necessary to impress upon some of-
fenders the wrongfulness of their conduct, but don't some, if not
all, offenders already know that what they did was wrong? And
aren't some offenders beyond education altogether? And how on
earth can one think modern modes of punishment, like impris-
onment, are capable of morally educating?
Imagine an offender who immediately after committing his
crime rushes to the police, confesses, pleads guilty, apologizes to
his victim, and throws himself on the mercy of the court. Such an
offender hardly seems as if he needs moral tutoring. On the con-
trary, a repentant wrongdoer, far from needing an education, is
an example to us all. Indeed, we may not think he deserves any
punishment, but if we do, then the moral education theory cannot
tell us why.
177
Likewise, "amoral risk-taker[s], revolutionary zealot[s], [and]
sociopathic personalities"" are, generally speaking, too far gone
cal Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives 151, 166-67 (Cambridge 1971) (attributing this
view to Hegel).
"Duff, Trials at 245 (cited in note 151). For a wonderful collection of essays on the
idea of repentance, see Amitai Etzioni and David E. Carney, eds, Repentence: A Compara-
tive Perspective (Roman & Littlefield 1997).
"See Du% Trials at 247 (cited in note 151) ("Penance, as self-imposed suffering which
expresses and assists repentance, aims to reconcile the penitent wrong-doer with others
and with himself.").
'
7
.See id at 246 ("A penance can assist and strengthen my repentant understanding of
what I have done: it... provides a focus and stimulus for my penitent attention.").
'"See Russ Shafer-Landau, Can Punishment Morally Educate?, 10 L & Phil 189, 190
(1991) (noting that the goal of moral education is to "yield[ ] a person who is an autono-
mous individual freely attached to the good").
"Hampton, Expressive Theory at 21 (cited in note 33), citing Joel Feinberg, Harmless
Wrongdoing 304-05 (Oxford 1988).
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for punishment to have much of an educative effect. We might
hope that punishment will turn them around, but such hope is of-
ten just wishful thinking. To recommend punishing such defiant
offenders, the moral education theory would have to posit a very
strong relationship between moral knowledge and wrongdoing,
i.e., that anyone who commits a crime by definition does not un-
derstand that what he did was wrong, or else he would not have
committed it. But that's implausible. Many if not most offenders
realize what they did was wrong. Once again, if we think such of-
fenders should nonetheless be punished, the moral education the-
ory cannot tell us why.
The existence of already repentant and unremittingly defiant
offenders does not, however, undermine the moral education the-
ory. It only limits its scope. When an offender already has re-
pented, or when the chances of getting him to repent are slim-to-
none, then a theory of punishment whose goal is to set in motion
a cycle of recognition-guilt-repentance simply "has no place.""'
This does not mean the offender shouldn't be punished. It only
means that his punishment must be based on grounds other than
moral education-most likely deterrence for the defiant, and ret-
ribution for the repentant. 80 Moral education should be part of
the picture, but it can't be all of it.'8'
Consequently, the moral reform theory may only apply to a
relatively narrow range of offenders. 8 ' It all depends on how
many offenders fall within the "already repentant" and "defiant"
categories. Those categories may cover many or most criminal of-
fenders, but a number of offenders may lie between those two ex-
tremes. These offenders may know in an abstract sense that they
have done wrong (first-order moral knowledge) but fail to fully
appreciate the nature of that wrong (second-order moral knowl-
edge)." Their cognitive apprehension of their wrongdoing may be
"James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance 272
(Oxford 1986).
"But see Duff, 20 Crime and Justice at 54 (cited in note 151) (arguing that punish-
ment of the already repentant is justified because "some penance is needed to reinforce
that repentance"; likewise, punishment of those we are "certain" will remain unrepentant
is justified because "we owe it to them not to regard them as beyond moral salvation").
"See Morris, 18 Am Phil Q at 271 (cited in note 152) ("The practice of punishment is
complex and any justification proposed as an exclusive one must, in my judgment, be met
with skepticism, if not scorn.").
"See von Hirsch, Censure at 75 (cited in note 64) ("Cases where punishment functions
... as a penitence leading to actual penance ... may be the exception rather than the
rule.").
"'See Lisa Anne Smith, The Moral Reform Theory of Punishment, 37 Ariz L Rev 197,
203 (1995). The moral reform theory thus might apply only to offenders who suffer from a
form of "moral ignorance," but who nonetheless appreciate the wrongfulness of their con-
[65:733
Shaming Punishments
fine, but their affective or emotional apprehension of it may be
lacking.' Punishment under the moral reform theory tries to tu-
tor this affective capacity, teaching the second-order lesson many
offenders may need.
Still, moral reform may sound good in theory, but isn't it silly
to think that our contemporary modes of punishment can edu-
cate? Can one honestly think our dominant mode of punish-
ment-imprisonment-is capable of providing moral education?
When the penitentiary was first created, hopes ran high that it
really would be a place for the transformation of men's souls," s
but history has dashed these hopes. No one would seriously claim
that today's prisons are sites of moral reform." If anything, the
opposite seems more likely.
Nor do our other dominant modes of sanctioning appear es-
pecially likely to educate an offender in the way moral reform
theory envisions. Probation sets limits on what an offender can
do. It may require him to stay away from bad influences and try
to keep a job, but it doesn't try to show him why what he did was
wrong. Likewise, community service may introduce the offender
to the virtues of helping others, but it too does nothing to show
the offender why what he did was wrong. And fines simply trans-
fer wealth from the offender to the state. What's the moral lesson
there? Perhaps nothing, or worse, perhaps it is that the well-to-do
can buy their way out of the wrongdoing that the not-so-well-to-
do must pay for with prison. 7
Yet the gap between the moral reform theory and our actual
practices points less to any weakness of the theory and more to
the need for innovation in the kinds of punishment the state im-
poses. As discussed below, some of the punishments commonly-
duct.
'"I am indebted to Dan Kahan for this point.
"See Hirsch, Rise of the Penitentiary at 18-20 (cited in note 5) (describing this "phil-
anthropic paradigm of carceral rehabilitation); Rothman, Discovery of the Asylum at 107
(cited in note 5) ("The prison would train the most notable victims of social disorder to dis-
cipline, teaching them to resist corruption.").
"See, for example, Shafer-Landau, 10 L & Phil at 203-04 (cited in note 177) (con-
cluding that "we have as yet no good reason for supposing incarceration an efficacious
means of morally educating the criminal offender").
'"But see Duff, Alternatives at 55-61 (cited in note 151) (arguing that traditional
forms of punishment, including community service, probation, and imprisonment, can be
understood as morally educative). Duff has since retreated from the position that prison
can be morally educative. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentence, Punishment, and Mercy, in
Etzioni and Carney, eds, Repentance 143, 167 (cited in note 174) (quoting Duff in 1995
personal correspondence as saying, "I'm inclined now to place less weight on imprison-
ment as a mode of communicative punishment (though it can have some place in such an
account), and more weight on [nIon-custodial punishments").
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though mistakenly-seen as shaming penalties offer innovation
along these lines.
3. Should punishment educate?
If with the right offenders and the right punishments, hard
treatment can educate, the question remains: Should punishment
even try to educate, especially since it is the state that's doing the
punishing/educating?
Punishing offenders in order to prevent future crime, or sim-
ply because they deserve it, is one thing. Punishing offenders in
order to get them to repent, however, sounds like it might be a
suitable occupation for a cleric vis-a-vis a member of his congre-
gation, but not for a liberal state vis-a-vis one of its citizens."
Isn't the moral reform theory illiberal?"5 9
Neutrality is often said to be the defining characteristic of
the liberal state.9 ° Put more grandly, the state must remain neu-
tral with respect to, and must not try to coerce its citizens into
embracing, any particular vision of the "good life." Legal perfec-
tionists may think the state should shepherd its citizens to vir-
tue, but liberals don't. On the contrary, the liberal state should
limit itself to supplying a framework of basic rights within which
"Utilitarianism may seem perfectly compatible with liberalism. See Jeffrie G. Mur-
phy, Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State, in Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retribu-
tion Reconsidered: More Essays in the Philosophy of Law 15, 20 (Kluwer 1992) (suggesting
that liberalism entails utilitarianism). The compatibility of retribution and liberalism,
however, is less clear. Compare id at 24-25 (suggesting that retributivism and liberalism
may be incompatible); Jeifrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 Ariz L Rev
73, 83 (1995) (same); Stanley C. Brubaker, Can Liberals Punish?, 82 Am Pol Sci Rev 821,
825 (1988) (same), with Jean Hampton, Liberalism, Retribution and Criminality, in Jules
L. Coleman and Allen Buchanan, eds, In Harm's Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg
159, 176 (Cambridge 1994) (arguing that retributivism and liberalism can be compatible).
Compare also Wojciech Sadurski, Theory of Punishment, Social Justice, and Liberal Neu-
trality, 7 L & Phil 351, 373 (1989) (arguing that liberalism entails retributivism), with Mi-
chael Davis, The Relative Independence of Punishment Theory, 7 L & Phil 321, 328-30
(1988) (suggesting that punishment theory is "relatively independent" of political theory).
..The same charge might be made against the shaming model. Compare Jeffrey
Rosen, The Social Police, The New Yorker 170, 175 (Oct 20 & 27, 1997) ("Kahan's enthusi-
asm for shaming penalties suggests a connection between the Chicago school of social
norms and an older, more conservative, and arguably creepier tradition of legal thought,
embodied by Lord Devlin, a British legal theorist."). Ies another matter altogether
whether that charge is fair.
"See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of
Principle 181, 191-92 (Harvard 1985) (arguing ,that liberalism requires "government [to]
be neutral on what might be called the question of the good life"). I realize that this claim
about liberalism is controversial insofar as liberalism may not really be neutral, nor really
committed to neutrality. See, for example, Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and
Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L Rev 1103, 1134 (1983) (arguing that "ethical liberalism is
not entirely neutral" and developing a non-neutral conception of liberalism).
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each individual can discover for himself or herself what the good
life means. If so, then isn't the state stepping beyond its legiti-
mate sphere of influence when it takes it upon itself to "morally
educate" its criminal offenders?
The moral reformist has two replies to this concern. One
stays within the limits of liberalism. The other goes beyond them.
First, within a liberal state, the so-called "harm principle"
specifies the legitimate boundaries of the criminal law.'91 The
state can validly criminalize only those actions that result in one
citizen's harming of another. But so long as it stays within those
boundaries, the state does no wrong if it tries to get criminal of-
fenders to understand and accept the constraints that the crimi-
nal law justifiably imposes. Although considerable debate sur-
rounds the scope of the harm principle,19 the state does not act
illiberally if it tries to educate its citizens to respect the prohibi-
tions of the criminal law, so long as the criminal law itself re-
spects the limits imposed by the harm principle. The moral re-
form theory and liberalism can thus peacefully coexist, all within
the limits of liberalism.
Still, this response may seem incomplete or unsatisfying. 9'
After all, the moral reform theory does ask the state to busy itself
trying to improve the moral character of its citizens, even if the
lessons it tries to teach are consistent with the liberal harm prin-
ciple. Moreover, because the goal of the moral education theory is
the offender's voluntary repentance and reconciliation with the
community, it presupposes that all citizens guilty of criminal
wrongdoing should value this moral reintegration into the com-
munity. If so, doesn't that presuppose a vision of the good life in
...For the classic statement of this view, see John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 13 (first
published 1859) (ITT Bobbs-Merrill 1956) (Currin V. Shields, ed) ("[Tihe only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others."). For more recent statements, see Joel
Feinberg, Harm to Others 15 (Oxford 1984) (providing "an effort to vindicate the tradi-
tional liberalism derived from Mill's On Liberty ... qualified and reformulated in the light
of the many accumulated difficulties and criticisms"); H.L.A_ Hart, Law, Liberty and Mo-
rality 5 (Stanford 1963) (defending Mill's harm principle with respect to the use of legal
coercion to enforce morality).
"See, for example, Feinberg, Harm to Others (discussing scope and content of harm
principle); Andrew von Hirsch, Extending the Harm Principle: Remote' Harms and Fair
Imputation, in A.P. Simester and A.T.H. Smith, eds, Harm and Culpability 259, 276 (Ox-
ford 1996) (explaining "why it is important to develop fair-imputation principles when
dealing with remote risks" as a ground for criminalization of conduct).
'"See, for example, von Hirsch, Censure at 73 (cited in note 64) (arguing that the
moral reform theory may be consistent with the harm principle but that it remains objec-
tionable insofar as it continues to focus on the "quality of the actor's own moral responses
to his harmfiul act").
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which such communal attachments are privileged or highly
prized?"9
To meet this concern, one must travel outside liberalism
proper and move toward a more communitarian conception of the
state, in which it is the state's business to be concerned with the
moral development of its citizens. If this sounds like a vision of
how, punishment functions in more intimate settings like that of
the family, it should.'95 The moral reform theory draws much of
its inspiration from the operation of punishment in such intimate
settings, trying to imitate that model for the state's own practices
of punishment wherever possible.
Which again raises the objection: A liberal state should not
concern itself with the moral development of its citizens. When
the state punishes, it should stay away from the "inner citadels of
the soul"; its aims should not include "bring[ing] about certain re-
sponsive attitudes in those whom it condemns."' Repentance is
within the jurisdiction of the church, where it rightly belongs. Or,
as the owner of one Georgia company forced to advertise its con-
viction for immigration violations in a Spanish-language newspa-
per put it, taking responsibility is one thing, but "laying your sins
at the foot of the cross, isn't that a little much?"97
Critics of the communitarian state are right to be worried.
The moral education theory of punishment asks a great deal. Of
those who impose punishment, it asks that they do so in the
spirit of a parent punishing a child. Of those who receive pun-
ishment, it asks that they respond to it and accept it as a way of
making amends. All of which may be asking too much of citizens
of the modern state.' Moreover, the moral education theory al-
ways runs the risk of state overreaching. The state might not rest
until the "heretic" has been "converted." Prudence, if not princi-
'"See John Deigh, On the Right to Be Punished: Some Doubts, 94 Ethics 191, 203
(1984) (stating that moral "reform theory is built on the postulation of two basic, human
goods: the good of harmonious social relations and the good of well-integrated moral per-
sonality").
' See Griffiths, 79 Yale L J at 387 (cited in note 152) (stating that "concern for what,
broadly speaking, is 'good for' a defendant caught up in the criminal process" is central to
the "Family Model" of that process). But see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Confessions, Criminals
and Community, 26 Harv CR-CL L Rev 327, 384 (1991) ("The present correctional system
is not imbued with love and concern, nor is there any apparent prospect for realizing such
a system.").
1'von Hirsch, Censure at 74 (cited in note 192).
"WWoolner, Am Law at 34 (cited in note 9).
'See Ellis McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology 147 (Cambridge 1901) ("The
modem citizen ... does not regard [the state] as something above and superior to himself,
as the ancient citizen regarded his city, as the child regards his parent, or as the religious
man his God.').
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ple, might thus counsel the state to punish with more modest
goals in mind.'
A complete reply to this objection would lead deep into politi-
cal philosophy and probably require a full-blown defense of the
communitarian state. For the time being, I settle for a more con-
textual inquiry. Some punishments that might find support in
the moral education theory, such as requiring offenders to attend
church,2" clearly do offend liberal sensibilities. But are those sen-
sibilities likewise offended when, say, a slumlord is required to
spend some time in his slum? I think the answer is far less clear.
C. Lex Talionis
Even if punishment can educate, and even if the state should
try to educate through punishment, how exactly can punishment
educate? The answer according to the moral reform theory is the
principle of lex talionis, popularly known as an "eye-for-an-eye."
But isn't an appeal to that discredited principle enough to dis-
credit the theory?20' No. The following Part explains why not. 22
1. How to punish? Traditional theories.
Philosophical discussions of punishment usually focus on
why we punish, and on how much we punish. The traditional
theories of punishment-retribution and deterrence-usually say
very little, however, about how we punish,0 ' which is not to say
that they say nothing about it.
Utilitarianism, for example, encourages architects of pun-
ishment to get the most deterrence at the lowest possible cost.
Consequently, modern-day economic scholars building on the in-
sights of classical utilitarianism have recommended greater use
of fines,2 which can in theory have the same deterrent effect as
" See id at 145 ("[If the state allows its attention to be distracted in the humble task
of frightening criminals from crime, by the higher ambition of converting them to virtue, it
is likely to fail in both.").
'See, for example, Cook, Liberty at 11 (cited in note 11).
"See Shafer-Landau, 10 L & Phil at 201 (cited in note 177) (noting that lex talionis
represents the best way to achieve "empathic knowledge" but concluding that the applica-
tion of lex talionis "would often involve clear violations of autonomy").
'The following Part draws heavily on the important, though unfortunately much-
neglected, article by Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 Ariz L Rev 25 (1992).
'See Duff, Alternatives at 43 (cited in note 151) (noting that philosophical discussions
of criminal punishment rarely focus on "what material forms... punishment [can] prop-
erly take").
'See, for example, Richard Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law 227 (Little, Brown
4th ed 1992) ("From an economic standpoint, the use of fines should be encouraged.");
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J Pol Econ 169, 193-
98 (1968) (presenting "several arguments which imply that social welfare is increased if
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imprisonment but are actually profitable to the state. They also
note that cutting back on the resources invested in detecting and
prosecuting crime, but then imposing heavy fines on those who do
face judgment, can also, again in theory, make punishment
cheaper with no sacrifice in the overall level of general deter-
rence.
205
Retributivism has even less to say about how to punish than
does utilitarianism. Setting aside for the moment the venerable
principle of lex talionis, retributivism generally has been preoc-
cupied with grading punishments (the "how much" question) and
less with constructing punishment (the "how to" question).2 ' To
its credit, retributivism insists that the severity of punishment
must be proportional to the moral seriousness of the offense. Ben-
tham described this demand for proportionality as a "good one,"
but also as one that was "more oracular than instructive."207 Con-
temporary theorists have tried to give greater content to the
idea,2 0 1 though the Supreme Court has all but given up trying to
decide when a punishment becomes disproportionate and there-
fore offensive to the Eighth Amendment, leaving the matter
largely to legislative judgment.0 9
Compared with utilitarianism and retributivism, the moral
reform theory of punishment has quite a bit to say about how to
punish. Surprisingly though, what it says is in praise of lex talio-
nis. This obviously requires some elaboration and explanation.
2. The talionic principle: objections.
In its simplest (and crudest) formulation, lex talionis re-
quires that the punishment an offender suffers mirrors the harm
he inflicted on his victim.
fines are used whenever feasible").
See Becker, 76 J Pol Econ at 184; David Friedman, Why Not Hang Them All, or The
Virtues of Inefficient Punishment 2 (Nov 27, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with U
Chi L Rev).
'See, for example, Paul H. Robinson, Desert, Crime Control, Disparity, and Units of
Punishment, in Anthony Duf, et al, eds, Penal Theory and Practice: Tradition and Inno-
vation in Criminal Justice 94 (Manchester 1994) ("[N]otions of desert concern primarily
the amount of punishment.").
'Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in John Bowring, ed, 1 The Collected
Work ofJeremy Bentham 365, 399 (William Tait 1843).
'See, for example, von Hirsch, Censure at 29-35 (cited in note 64) (arguing that a
"living standard" measurement should be used to determine proportionality of punish-
ment to crime").
'See, for example, Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957, 965 (1991) (opinion by Scalia)
("IT]he Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee."). See also id at 1001
(Kennedy concurring) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment "forbids only extreme sen-
tences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime").
[65:733
Shaming Punishments
Today, lex talionis is the object of philosophical derision and
is usually found only in discussions about the death penalty.1'
When the principle is cast in its crude form, this derision is well
deserved. Lex talionis is widely thought, for example, to recom-
mend morally unacceptable modes of punishment (like gouging
out eyes) for some offenses (like assault), while having little or
nothing to say about how to punish other offenses (like pejury or
blackmail).
In particular, lex talionis faces three main objections to
which an acceptable interpretation of the principle must reply:
Taken literally, lex talionis would authorize barbarous
treatment. Rapists would be raped, mutilators mutilated, and so
on. Lex talionis is therefore morally grotesque."'
Taken literally, lex talionis cannot successfully prescribe a
punishment for offenses, like perjury, in which the loss is not as-
signable to any particular victim. Lex talionis may apply when we
know who got hurt and how they got hurt, but many crimes lack
a specific victim. Lex talionis is therefore woefully incomplete."2
Taken literally, lex talionis focuses only on the harm the of-
fender has caused and ignores the offender's moral culpability.
An offender guilty of intentional homicide would get the same
punishment as one guilty of reckless homicide because the re-
sulting harm-the victim's death-is the same. Lex talionis is
therefore an ugly recipe for disproportionate punishments."'
A principle that defends morally grotesque punishments,
that is incomplete, or that recommends disproportionate punish-
ments is unlikely to carry much appeal. Still, talionic or talionic-
like punishments have an enduring-if sometimes strange and
disturbing-allure.
Part of that allure involves the sense that talionic punish-
ments (also known as mirroring or analogical punishments) "fit"
"'See, for example, Ten, Crime at 151 (cited in note 67) ("[C]apital punishment seems
to be the only form of punishment which is still frequently supported by appeal to lex ta-
lionis.").
"See, for example, id at 152 (arguing that lex talionis would underwrite "certain
forms of punishment which are too cruel to be tolerated by any civilized penal system").
22 See, for example, Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Commu-
nity Values 17 (Routledge 1988) (arguing that lex talionis supplies clear guidance as to the
proper measure of punishment in only a limited number of cases); Ten, Crime at 151 (cited
in note 67) (noting that lex talionis "cannot be applied to many crimes").
23' See, for example, Lacey, State Punishment at 17 (cited in note 212) (arguing that lex
talionis does not include the principle of responsibility as a limit on who may be pun-
ished); Ten, Crime at 152 (cited in note 67) (noting that lex talionis is objectionable be-
cause the "formula it uses for determining the correct punishment is solely in terms of the
harm done by the crime, and makes no allowance for the morally important mental states
of the offender").
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the crime in a way that seems intuitively "natural" or "right."214
Examples of talionic punishments abound, though more in his-
tory and literature, and less so in contemporary practice. 15 In the
ancient Greek world, for instance, the tongue of an offending ora-
tor might be removed, sex offenders might be castrated, soldiers
who wantonly burned houses might be allocated poor accommo-
dations, and a false accuser might receive the punishment that
would have been received by the person he falsely accused.216
Greek mythology is another rich source of talionic punishments,
including the penalty of the "golden touch" visited upon Midas for
his avarice. 7 The rings of Dante's Hell provide still more exam-
ples of talion-inspired justice.1 '
Yet whatever intuitive appeal it may have, lex talionis re-
mains at face value a morally unacceptable principle by which to
inflict punishment. How, then, can the moral reform theory pos-
sibly embrace it?
3. Rehabilitating lex talionis.
The philosophical rehabilitation of lex talionis begins with
the obvious: It cannot be interpreted literally. If lex talionis re-
quires the state to impose on an offender as punishment the
"same" harm he inflicted on his victim (assuming there is one),
then lex talionis is an impossible maxim to follow because the
punishment will, of necessity, "take place at a different time and
with different dramatis personae from those of the original of-
fense."'19 Thus, wholly apart from any moral objections to the lit-
eral reading of lex talionis, such a reading is itself literally impos-
"'See W.S. Gilbert, The Mikado, or The Town of Titipu: The Complete Text of the
Gilbert & Sullivan Opera 32 (Winthrop Armes Gilbert & Sullivan Opera Co 1939) ("My
object all sublime, I shall achieve in time, to make the punishment fit the crime:").
"'But see Sam S. Souryal, Dennis W. Potts, and Abdullah I. Alobied, The Penalty of
Hand Amputation for Theft in Islamic Justice, 22 J Crim Just 249, 255 (1994) (describing
punishment of hand amputation for theft in context of Islamic law).
"See Trevor J. Saunders, Plato's Penal Code: Tradition, Controversy and Reform in
Greek Penology 358-59 (Oxford 1991) (listing a compilation of crime-specific punishments
culled from ancient Greek writers and other ancient Greek historical sources). See also
George Ives, A History of Penal Methods 54-57 (Patterson Smith 1970) (describing "poetic"
punishments used in the Middle Ages).
"' See Saunders, Plato's Penal Code at 360.
"'For example, Dante's hypocrites walk slowly around the eighth ring of Hell wearing
cloaks that are "dazzlingly gilded" on the outside but "all of lead" on the inside, thus re-
flecting the outward lightness but inward burden of their hypocrisy. Dante Alighieri, 1
The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: The Inferno 349 (Oxford 1996) (Robert M. Durling,
trans and ed).
"'Waldron, 34 Ariz L Rev at 32 (cited in note 202). See also St. George Tucker, ed, 5
Blackstone's Commentaries *12-14 (Lawbeok Exchange 1996) (discussing impossibility of
applying lex talionis literally).
[65:733
Shaming Punishments
sible to followY Moreover, once we accept a nonliteral interpre-
tation of the basic talionic idea of somehow reflecting the offense
back on the offender through punishment, the repertoire of possi-
ble "talionic," or analogical, punishments extends well beyond
those cruel inflictions that usually come to mind.
Every criminal act has certain features. Some of these fea-
tures make the act wrong, while others are morally irrelevant
and have little if anything to do with why the action was wrong.
For example, if an offender throws a brick one Friday evening
that causes the victim to lose sight in one eye, what makes the
act wrong is that it violated the victim's bodily integrity. It may
or may not be relevant that the victim's physical injury was the
loss of sight in one eye, but the fact that a brick caused the injury
or that the crime occurred on a Friday evening is irrelevant; nei-
ther fact affects our assessment of the act's wrongfulness.
The key to intelligent application of the talionic principle is
therefore identifying which features of the offender's act are mor-
ally relevant, and then devising morally acceptable inflictions
that somehow reflect the relevant features back onto the offender.
Which features of any particular criminal act one should try to re-
flect in an offender's punishment and which to ignore depends on
the background theory of punishment deployed in support of lex
talionis. In the end, the effort to identify the relevant elements
will be "guided by our best sense of what made the action wrong
in the first place." 21
Although lex talionis usually is associated with retributiv-
ism, especially the retributivism of Kant,2 2 that association is not
inevitable. Indeed, the father of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham,
was also something of a supporter of lex talionis, though his sup-
port was of course based on his utilitarianism. According to Ben-
tham, for example:
Punishment can act as a preventative only when the idea of
it, and of its connexion with the crime, is present to the
mind. Now, to be present, it must be remembered, it must
have been learnt. But of all punishments that can be imag-
'See Waldron, 34 Ariz L Rev at 32 (cited in note 202).
" Id at 37. Waldron goes on: lex talionis "involves nothing more.., than (a) thinking
through why the offense is wrong, and (b) thinking about the possibility of... reversal of
roles, which would allow the offender to experience an action relevantly like his offense
from another point of view." Id at 45.
'See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice *332 (Bobbs-Merrill
1965) (John Ladd, trans) ("Only the Law of retribution (jus talionis) can determine exactly
the kind and degree of punishment."). See also Kieinig, Punishment and Desert at 121
(cited in note 67) ("Of those who have appealed to the lex talionis, Kant comes closest to a
literal form. ").
1998]
The University of Chicago Law Review
ined, there are none of which the connexion with the offence
is either so easily learnt, or so efficaciously remembered, as
those of which the idea is already in part associated with
some part of the offense.'
Lex talionis was "admirable" in this respect." Although Ben-
tham believed literal lex talionis was "rarely practicable,"' he
devoted an entire chapter to a discussion of punishments that
were "analogous" to the offense. 26
Lex talionis (suitably refined) also fits the needs of the moral
reform theory.' The moral education theory posits that the
criminal offender, at some second-order level, does not fully un-
derstand or appreciate what he has done wrong. The aim of pun-
ishment is thus to show him, if possible, what that wrong was,
and "[h]uman nature [may be] such that the vivid lesson con-
veyed by 'turning the tables' on the offender is the quickest route
to awareness of wrong-doing and repentance." In other words,
lex talionis, read against the background of the moral education
theory, urges that sanctions be designed in a way that makes an
offender directly or vicariously experience the harm he has
caused. Read in this way, lex talionis is a mode of instruction
based on the simple idea of role reversal.
Indeed, the idea of role reversal nicely captures both the tali-
onic and the educative elements involved in many creative pun-
ishments. For instance, in the brick-throwing example the court
ordered the offender, a juvenile, to pay $24,000 in restitution; but
it also ordered him to wear a patch over his eye that he could re-
move only when sleeping.22 The hope, one imagines, was that he
might really learn what it was like to suffer in the way he made
his victim suffer or, in other words, to teach him a little empa-
thy.2° Recast in this way, lex talionis is much less vulnerable to
the three objections mentioned above.
'Bentham, Principles of Penal Law at 403 (cited in note 207).
m Id.
2'Id.
' See id at ch VIII ("Of Analogy Between Crimes and Punishments").
See Hampton, 13 Phil & Pub Aff at 227 (cited in note 152) (stating that "the intui-
tion behind lex talionis ... best supports the concept of punishment as moral education").
'Waldron, 34 Ariz L Rev at 31 (cited in note 202). See also Moberly, Ethics of Pun-
ishment at 207 (cited in note 152) ("In punishing... you seek to destroy [the offender's]
will to evil by holding up a mirror before his eyes, in order that he may see himself as he
really is."); R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education 279 (Allen 1966) ("The effectiveness of...
punishments in moral education depends largely on the extent to which they bring home
imaginatively the consequences of actions as they affect other people.").
'See Salamone, Eye Patch, Orlando Sent at Al (cited in note 17).
'See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Mich L Rev 1574, 1579 (1987)
(Empathy is "understanding the experience or situation of another, both affectively and
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First, lex talionis isn't morally grotesque, since it needn't
embrace barbarous or cruel punishments. Rape, for example, may
be described at various levels of abstraction. If rape is the sexual
violation of a woman by a man, then it would be impossible to ap-
ply lex talionis in the case of rape, because the gender-specificity
of the offense makes raping a rapist impossible. If we ascend to a
slightly higher level of abstraction and treat rape as a crime of
sexual violation regardless of gender, we may avoid the problem
of gender-specificity, but we still encounter the problem of bar-
barity, because sexually violating a rapist would be morally out-
of-bounds.
If we take still one step more, however, we can see how it
might be possible to add a talionic element to existing sanctions
against rape. Part of the harm of rape consists in the "trauma,
indignity and degradation" it entails." 1 Short of actually physi-
cally violating an offender in order that he might himself experi-
ence that trauma, perhaps the closest one can come to a talionic
treatment of rape would be to force the offender to experience it
vicariously. Jean Hampton, for example, has described an "inno-
vative program" in which imprisoned sex offenders are "forced to
listen to the words and accusations of rape victims, and they en-
gage in role playing in which they assume the role of the women
they raped." 2 According to Hampton, "[s]uch experiences force
[the men] to deal with the feelings of anger, hurt, and frustration
that they come to realize their actions have caused others.'
Second, the potential scope of lex talionis is greater than it
might at first appear. Applied with enough flexibility and imagi-
nation, it might even be able to handle offenses that lack an iden-
tifiable victim and are generally understood instead to be offenses
against the public or against the integrity of some vital public in-
cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself to be in the position of the other.").
" Waldron, 34 Ariz L Rev at 37 (cited in note 202).
'See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribu-
tion, 39 UCLA L Rev 1659, 1689-90 (1992), citing Claire Glasman, Discussing Rape With
Rapists-Or Can Men Change?, 13 New L J 969 (July 14, 1989). See also Tom Mashberg,
About Face: Program Forces Batterers to Accept Responsibility For Their Actions, Chi Trib
1 (Oct 3, 1994) (describing similar confrontational program used as condition of probation
for men convicted of spousal abuse). Confrontational encounters of this kind are different
from criminal mediation programs that "stress[ I forgiveness and reconciliation before vic-
tims have the vindication of a public finding that the offender is guilty." Jennifer Gerarda
Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 Emory
L J 1247, 1249 (1994). See also Harry Mika, The Practice and Prospect of Victim-Offender
Programs, 46 SMU L Rev 2191, 2196 (1993) (noting that the Victim-Offender Reconcilia-
tion Program "is a process of negotiation that seeks to facilitate restitution [to the vic-
tim").
Hampton, 39 UCLA L Rev at 1690.
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stitution. Consider, for example, pejury. We might say that the
"victim" of perjury is the person who suffers as a result of the of-
fender's lie under oath. But that would miss a good deal of what
makes perjury wrong, because perjury not only injures the target
of the lie, it also jeopardizes the integrity of the court and its fact-
finding procedures. How might one bring home to an offender the
relatively more abstract nature of this wrong? How best to edu-
cate him?
Jeremy Waldron offers the following thoughts. Insofar as the
wrongness of perjury involves impeding the ability of the courts
to function as they should, one might deny the perjurer access to
the courts for some specified period of time, with a view that the
offender might learn the value of preserving the courts' integ-
rity.' Or consider the crime of blackmail. If the wrong in black-
mail is the offender's invasion of the victim's privacy, 5 lex talio-
nis might suggest that a court officer be authorized to rummage
through the offender's belongings and publish some aspect of the
offender's life he wishes to keep concealed from public view 6
Lastly, lex talionis need not justify disproportionate punish-
ments. Lex talionis is often dismissed because, as traditionally
construed, it looks only to the harm the offender caused and re-
mains indifferent to his mental state. Under this traditional view,
an intentional homicide would get the same punishment as a
negligent or reckless one. Surely that can't be right. Once it's re-
cast, however, lex talionis might be able to account for an of-
fender's mental state. Recognizing that an intentional homicide is
different from an indifferent one, we might try to register that
difference in the lesson our punishment aims to teach the of-
fender. Again, Waldron offers an illustration. For example, inas-
much as the wrongfulness of negligent or reckless conduct con-
sists in part in subjecting another person to substantial and un-
justifiable risk or chance of harm, perhaps the punishment or the
degree of punishment to which the offender is subject could itself
be made subject to chance."3
See Waldron, 34 Ariz L Rev at 44 (cited in note 202) ("Such a punishment is unfa-
miliar, but [lex talionis] makes no claim to model our 'intuitions' of just punishment, if
those Intuitions' have been based on some other principle or penal approach.").
'What, if anything, makes blackmail a crime is a matter of considerable debate. For a
sampling of the various positions, see Symposium, Blackmail, 141 U Pa L Rev 1565
(1993).
'See Waldron, 34 Ariz L Rev at 44-45 (cited in note 202); id at 45 ("If the wrongness
of [blackmail] has to do with its exploitation of the victim's vulnerability, again it is not
hard to imagine possible modes of retribution.").
'See id at 46 ("[Lex talionis] will recognize a distinction between intention and reck-
lessness in regard to the causation of death and vary the punishment accordingly.').
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Obviously, these suggestions are deeply problematic and
bring to mind all kinds of objections. Would we really want, for
example, to deny a pejurer access to the courts for wrongs of all
kinds? Would nothing about an offender's life be off limits?
Should punishment itself, even for reckless or negligent conduct,
purposefully be made subject to a role of the dice?
In fairness, Waldron offers these ideas only to suggest ways
of thinking about lex talionis. They are not meant to be well-
developed proposals for practical reform. In the end, it may not be
appropriate to apply lex talionis in anything even remotely like
the ways suggested. But that is no argument against applying it
where it is appropriate, as it is with many of the offenses now
subject to innovative sanctioning.
Moreover, although recasting lex talionis and linking it to the
moral reform theory of punishment avoids many of the problems
traditionally leveled against lex talionis, doing so creates other
problems. For example, the moral reform theory works best when
sentencing is individualized. It calls upon the creativity and
imagination of the sentencing judge to figure out just what pun-
ishment would "fit' a particular offender and his particular of-
fense, and to identify what kind of imposition would best serve
the educative mission lex talionis sets for itself. Talionic punish-
ments thus require considerable toleration of judicial discretion
and diversity in punishment.
This toleration not only swims against the current trend to-
ward uniformity and rule-based sentencing guidelines, it also in-
vites the kinds of problems that produced this trend in the first
place. Among other things, the more individualized sentencing
becomes, i.e., the more room that exists for judges to take account
of the particular facts and circumstances of an offender and an of-
fense, the more room exists for the exercise of bias and prejudice.
Moreover, individualized sentencing also makes it more difficult
to determine whether similarly situated offenders have been
treated similarly. That judgment will become even more difficult
if the universe of possible sanctions is opened up to include tali-
onic punishments, which would make that universe itself qualita-
tively more diverse as a result."
'See von Hirsch, Censure at 76 (cited in note 64) (arguing that "maldng the punish-
ment fit the crime" would lead to a proliferation of sentences and make severity compari-
sons harder).
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IV. EDUCATING THROUGH PUNISHMENT
The shaming model explains many of the punishments that
have recently received widespread attention. Examples include:
Requiring a shoplifter to stand outside the store from which she
stole wearing a sign, "I stole from this store. Don't be a thief. This
could happen to you"; requiring drunk drivers to attach a "CON-
VICTED: DWI" bumper sticker to their cars; and displaying in
the newspaper, or on local cable access TV, the names and faces
of men caught soliciting prostitutesY9 All these sanctions may
successfully condemn and shame. They may even be effective de-
terrents, but they do little to educate.
Other creative punishments are sometimes described as
shaming penalties,24° but they don't actually fit the shaming
model very well, largely because they don't require the offender to
disclose his offense to an audience that would not normally al-
ready be aware of it. Many of these sanctions do, however, fit the
educating model and are better seen as talionic. Rather than
serve as mechanisms of shame, they are instead intended to set
in motion the moral sequence of perception of wrongdoing, guilt,
and repentance.
I break these sanctions down into two types: talionic pun-
ishments and talionic restitution. I also discuss how apology ritu-
als, which are not talionic, fit within the educating model.
A. Talionic Punishments
Talionic punishments force an offender to somehow experi-
ence the harm he has caused. Although these sanctions appear to
be relatively rare compared with shaming penalties like signs
and bumper stickers, they do pop up from time to time.
For example, Judge Joe Brown of Memphis, Tennessee or-
dered a robber to allow his victim (accompanied by police officers)
to enter the robber's home and take something of similar value to
what the robber had taken from the victim. 4 Similarly, a New
York City slumlord was sentenced to house arrest in one of his
own slums where his tenants greeted him with a sign, "Welcome
Reptile!"24 ' Such talionic sanctions, which hopefully carry an edu-
'See notes 9-10, 12 and accompanying text.
"See, for example, Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 631-34 (cited in note 31).
" 'See Brown, Instructional Penalties, NY Times at B16 (cited in note 16).
'See Instead of Jail, NY Times at A22 (cited in note 15). But compare Andrew von
Hirsch, Punishment to Fit the Criminal, The Nation 901-02 (June 25, 1988) (noting that
one "slumlord was able to thwart the intent of his punishment by bringing along his own
repairmen and guards").
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cative message, should be contrasted with the kinds of sanctions
the shaming model would recommend under similar circum-
stances. For example, under the shaming model the thief might
simply be forced to wear a sign publicizing his crime, while the
landlord might be forced to post a sign on his property proclaim-
ing it a slum.
Finding ways to punish men guilty of soliciting prostitutes
also brings out the contrast between shaming and educating. The
shaming model recommends simply publicizing the names of
these men in the local newspaper or on local cable TV. The edu-
cating model, in contrast, endorses a different strategy, which can
be seen at work in San Francisco's "School for Johns."2" First-
time offenders arrested in San Francisco for soliciting prostitutes
don't have charges filed against them. Instead, they are required
to pay $500 and attend an all-day seminar, officially called the
"First Offender Prostitution Program," but commonly known as
the "School for Johns." After an assistant district attorney tells
them what they can expect by way of jail time if they get caught
again, the "students" receive lectures from former prostitutes who
describe tragic and horrible stories of life on the street, detailing
the social consequences of prostitution as well as the medical
risks.' The men thus learn about the harms to which their con-
duct contributes, whether or not they take the lesson to heart.
Or consider the following example of talionic punishment
from Gastonia, North Carolina, where a man rammed his car into
an auto being driven by an interracial couple. 5 Maybe the only
harm the offender caused was the damage done to the couple's
vehicle, in which case it might have been fitting for the offender
to have been forced to repair the car, or to have been denied ac-
cess to his own car for some period of time. The judge, however,
thought the damage to the car was not what really made the of-
fender's act wrong. What made it wrong was the racist message it
conveyed. Consequently, the judge ordered the man to watch
"Mississippi Burning," a movie recounting the struggle for civil
rights in Mississippi. 6 The hope was that the man might learn a
lesson in toleration.
'See Deutschman, Playboy at 46 (cited in note 13).
'See id. See also Cemetery Vandals Told to Attend Funeral, UPI (Jan 22, 1988) (A
judge ordered cemetery vandals to attend funeral in order to teach them "'ow the dead
are venerated in our culture' and why the community was outraged."); Making the Pun-
ishment Fit the Crime, Chi Trib 24 (May 28, 1992) (editorial) (Drunk drivers forced to at-
tend similar confrontation sessions.).
'See Mississippi Burning, UPI (cited in note 19).
'Id.
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A similar approach to crimes of intolerance has been used in
Los Angeles where, as part of a negotiated plea, fourteen mem-
bers of the Fourth Reich Skinheads were forced to participate in a
program designed to "enlighten and frighten.' Dubbed "Opera-
tion Grow Hair," the skinhead members met with U.S. District
Judge Terry Hatter, who is African-American; saw "Schindler's
List"; toured the Simon Wiesenthal Center; listened to the stories
of two Holocaust survivors; and met with a prominent preacher
who some of the skinheads had plotted to kill.' Again, the pun-
ishment was geared to teach, regardless of whether or not the
lesson ultimately took hold.
The talionic element of these punishments is admittedly at-
tenuated. Indeed, to describe it as "talionic" may be more mis-
leading than it is illuminating. Nonetheless, insofar as they try to
impress upon the offender in as concrete and vivid a way as pos-
sible the nature of the harm he has caused, I submit that they
can still be looked upon as "talionic," even if they don't require
the offender to experience those harms more directly.
In any event, notice again that none of these sanctions are
strictly speaking shaming penalties (though they might qualify as
"guilting" penalties), because none require an offender to publi-
cize his wrongdoing. Of course, because they are so out of the or-
dinary, punishments of this sort naturally tend to attract a good
deal of media publicity, and so awareness of the offender's
wrongdoing usually reaches a wider audience than it otherwise
would. But the publicity is not part of the sanction. It is the sanc-
tion's novelty that produces the publicity, not the sanction itself.
While these talionic punishments do, under the right circum-
stances, seem at least capable of hitting their educative mark,
others seem more likely to miss it. Talionic punishments misfire
for a vaiiety of reasons. Sometimes they misfire because they ac-
centuate an aspect of the offender's wrongdoing that is morally
irrelevant. For example, Judge Ted Poe of Houston, Texas, known
as the "King of Shame,"249 ordered a man convicted of fondling
two girls to whom he had given piano lessons to "donate" his pi-
ano to a children's home and prohibited him from playing the pi-
'TJim Newton, Skinheads Get Crash Course in Tolerance, Star-Trib 5A (Jan 1, 1994).
See also Judge Orders Victim of Theft to Steal from Thief, St. Petersburg Times 7A (Oct 3,
1991) (describing judge who orders defendants to watch "Boyz N the Hood" apparently in
an effort to scare them straight); Michener Offers To Teach Vandals About Holocaust, Chi
Trib C24 (June 7, 1990) (Youths convicted of anti-Semitic vandalism required to read
chapter about the Holocaust from John Michener's book Poland.).
'Newton, Skinheads, Star-Trib at 5A.
" Kelly McMurry, For Shame: Paying For Crime Without Serving Time, But With A
Dose of Humility, Trial 12 (May 1, 1997).
[65:733
Shaming Punishments
ano for ten yearsY A sanction like this may qualify as talionic in
some weak sense, but it conveys no real lesson. It pays too much
attention to the poetic justice of talionic punishments and too lit-
tle attention to their educative function 1
At other times, it is harder to separate out the relevant from
the irrelevant. For example, a judge in Tampa, Florida, sentenced
a man whose reckless driving had resulted in the death of a teen-
ager to two years house arrest and three years probation. The ac-
cident had occurred on Thanksgiving day. Consequently, during
the five year span of his sentence, the man was required to spend
Thanksgiving and Christmas in the local jail. 2 Generally the
date on which a crime occurs is morally irrelevant; however, here
the timing of the teenager's death does appear relevant to the
harm the offender caused, because the happiness typically asso-
ciated with those holidays will for the victim's family now be as-
sociated with sadness. The offender will be denied the warmth of
family and friends during the holidays, just as his actions denied
that warmth to his victim's family.
Other talionic punishments don't just misfire; they backfire.
They treat the offender as less than a person, and in so doing
teach the wrong lesson. For example, an Ohio judge is reported to
have required an offender convicted of spousal abuse to stand still
while his wife spat in his face.' Although a part of the husband's
abuse consisted of him spitting in her face, allowing her to spit in
his goes too far in the direction of literal lex talionis. Even if we
have under the circumstances little concern for the husband's
dignity and moral status, we should still be concerned about the
corrupting effects that such treatment may have on the character
of his spouse, as well as on that of the rest of us.'
'"See Gary Taylor, Texas Defendants Receive Additional Poe-etic Justice, Natl L J A23
(July 18, 1994).
"'Likewise, forcing offenders who are doctors to provide health care, or dentists to
provide dental care, has a poetic quality to it, but it typically lacks any educational value.
See, for example, Creative Difficulties, Natl L J 51 (Feb 7, 1994) (describing Judge Poe's
practice of sentencing probationers to community service reflecting their occupation). See
also Rock Manager Convicted on Drug Charges to Use Music to Fight Drugs, UPI (Apr 26,
1988) (Manager of Bon Jovi and Motley Crue required to use industry connections to make
an antidrug documentary and stage an antidrug rock concert.).
'See Sue Carlton, He'll Spend Holidays in Jail for Fatal Wreck, St. Petersburg Times
1A (Oct 20, 1995). See also Ron Schara, Hunter Will Be Cooling Heels in Jail for Deer Sea-
son, Star Trib 19C (Oct 20, 1991) (A hunter convicted of illegal killing of black bear re-
quired to spend deer season in jail.).
'See Greenhut, Milwaukee J Sent at All (cited in note 28). I realize that reasonable
people will react differently to the examples I discuss in the text. For example, although I
found the spitting example troubling, I discovered colleagues who liked it.
"See Waldron, 34 Ariz L Rev at 38 (cited in note 202) (noting tendency of literal lex
talionis to "encourage... nasty sadism").
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An even clearer case of going too far comes once again from
the courtroom of Judge Joe Brown. Recall that one of Judge
Brown's creative, and appropriately talionic, punishments is to
allow victims of robbery to enter the home of the offender and
remove something of comparable value. In one case, however, the
thief had nothing of monetary value for the victim to take. In-
stead, the victim took a picture of the thief's deceased girlfriend
and burned it in front of him. 5 Such an exercise teaches no one
any lesson worth learning. On the contrary, it conveys a lesson in
callousness.
B. Talionic Restitution
Unlike talionic punishments, talionic restitution does not re-
quire the offender to more or less directly experience the harm he
has caused. Instead, it tries to impress upon him the harm he has
done and hopefully teach the requisite lesson by forcing him to
repair it.
Talionic restitution differs from simple restitution. Simple
restitution focuses on compensating the victim much as tort law
doesY As such, simple restitution merely requires the offender
to pay for the material harm he has caused. Money changes
hands, but not much else. Simple restitution is therefore nontali-
onic.
However, restitution can take on a talionic cast. Indeed, one
of the earliest proponents of restitution in the criminal law, Al-
bert Eglash, argued long ago that the "restitutional act has a po-
etic justice about it."" As an example of what he had in mind, he
mentioned the auto thief who "can offer to wash the victim's car
each Saturday for a month, or to Simonize it, or repair some me-
chanical difficulty."255 A more contemporary example might be re-
quiring graffiti "artists" to clean up their handiworkY9 Such an
See Humiliation, Salt Lake Trib at Al (cited in note 16) (reporting that the thief
cried as the picture was being burned).
'See Randy Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87 Ethics
279, 289 (1977) (describing "pure" restitutional system as one in which the "point" is not
the offender's suffering, but the offended party's compensation). Talionic restitution is also
different from community service, because talionic restitution, unlike community service,
requires the offender to repair the particular kind of harm he has caused, not simply to
provide some general service to the community.
'Albert Eglash, Creative Restitution, A Broader Meaning for an Old Term, 48 J Crim
L, Criminol & Pol Sci 619, 620 (1958).
"Id.
'See, for example, George Frank, Graffiti Cleanup Is Possible Punishment, LA Times
B3 (Apr 12, 1990). See also Ive Never Had Anybody Run Over a House Before", UPI (May
14, 1982) (A college student convicted of DWI who crashed his car into a house was given
the option to paint the house after it had been repaired in order to reduce his jail sen-
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approach, if it succeeds, is doubly virtuous. Not only does the of-
fender repair the material damage he has caused, but with luck,
he comes in the course of his efforts to better understand the im-
pact of the harm he has caused. Moreover, and with more luck,
the offender also learns that making amends-repairing the
damage-is the proper moral response to wrongdoing.
Many creative punishments are examples of talionic restitu-
tion. Judge Larry Schack, for example, ordered an eighteen-year-
old offender who had stolen $468.42 worth of food from a local
Winn-Dixie to work at the store. The judge's aim was educative.
As he said to the eighteen-year-old: "I want you to get to know
the people who manage the store.... I want you to know the peo-
ple you tried to steal from." 60 Perhaps the offender might be re-
quired to work until he paid off the $468.42, with the idea that he
might learn the value of that sum to his victims. An educative
sanction of this kind stands in marked contrast to the shaming
models way of dealing with shoplifters, which is simply to re-
quire them to stand in front of the store wearing a sign an-
nouncing their offense.
Judge Walter Williams of Chattanooga, Tennessee, is espe-
cially good at the art of talionic restitution. He has, for example,
required a man convicted of breaking into a church to shine the
pews and an offender guilty of setting off fire alarms to polish the
city's fire trucks.261 While these restitutionary acts may not force
the offenders to repair the specific harm they caused, they do
bring them into contact with members of the church and the city's
fire department, respectively, and in so doing may work to edu-
cate the offenders. In the case of the church, the offender may
come to learn how sacred the church property is to its members,
and in the case of the firemen, how dangerous and wasteful it is
for firemen to be forced to respond to false alarms. And these do,
after all, seem to be the kinds of lessons the offenders need to
learn.
If talionic punishments sometimes misfire when they become
"too talionic," talionic restitution can misfire when it becomes "too
restitutionary," placing emphasis more on compensating than on
educating. In both cases the educational thrust of the sanction is
tence.).
'Monica Davey, Judge Imposes Shame with His Sentences, St. Petersburg Times Al
(Feb 16, 1997).
" See The Give 'Em Hell Judge: Justice with an Iron Fist, Newsweek 22 (Feb 6, 1995).
See also Charlotte Libov, Creative Sentences for Youths, NY Times lCN (July 14, 1985)
(Two Connecticut youths arrested for setting fire to pile of leaves required to "wash[ I
down the fire truck at the local firehouse.").
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lost. For example, a Connecticut defendant convicted of a hit-and-
run that resulted in serious injury to the victim was sentenced to
a term of incarceration, part of which was suspended, and five
years probation.2 As a condition of probation, he was required to
make a charitable "donation" of $2,500 to the New Britain Hospi-
tal where the victim of the hit-and-run had been treated.s While
such a condition may look talionic insofar as it links the required
"charitable" act to the hospital that treated the victim, 64 it does
little to impress upon the offender the nature of his wrongdo-
ing.2' He simply sends in his check without really repairing the
harm he has caused. Requiring the offender to work in the hospi-
tal's trauma ward, where he could witness firsthand the human
consequences of hit-and-runs, would have been a better ap-
proach .s Talionic restitution is also different from community
'State v Pieger, 42 Conn App 460, 680 A2d 1001, 1005 (1996), affd, 240 Conn 639, 692
A2d 1273 (1997).
'Id at 1005-06. For other examples of offenders who have been forced to join or do-
nate money to an organization or institution, see Edmond's Money Sought for Babies,
Wash Post D5 (Feb 8, 1990) (nonprofit public interest law group urging drug dealer be
forced to pay $3.96 million to D.C. General Hospital to help care for "crack babies"); Judy
Farah, Rule of Law: Crime and Creative Punishment, Wall St J A15 (Mar 15, 1995) (re-
porting that a man convicted of hitting a woman was forced to donate car to local battered
women's shelter); Judge Gives Gun Violators Unusual Sentence, UPI (Oct 10, 1982) (re-
porting that gun law violators were allowed to join gun control organizations in lieu of im-
prisonment). See also He Finds a Way to Be Heard, Natl L J A23 (July 28, 1997) (reporting
that singer Barry Manilow agreed to donate $5,000 to the American Tinnitus Association
in order to settle civil suit brought by judge who claimed his hearing was damaged at a
1993 Manilow concert). See generally Jaimy M. Levine, Comment, "Join the Sierra Club!":
Imposition of Ideology as a Condition of Probation, 142 U Pa L Rev 1841, 1874-77 (1994)
(collecting examples of "ideology-related" probation conditions).
'According to the court, however, the "donation [was] a realistic method of making
the defendant aware of the damage he has wrought as a result of his offense." Pieger, 680
A2d at 1005-06.
'This, of course, is less true when the offender is actually required to work for the
charity, in which case he may learn the value of the goal to which it is dedicated. See, for
example, Ronald Sullivan, Beer-Flinger Sent to a Fitting Cooler: Gay-Rights Office, NY
Times B1 (May 22, 1991) (A man convicted of throwing beer can at Mayor Dinkins "as he
marched with a contingent of gay Irish in St. Patrick's Parade... [was] sentenced to a
week of duty in the Mayor's Office for the Lesbian and Gay Community.").
'Similarly, Cook County Judge Marcia Orr required a man who injured a friend with
a baseball bat to spend four weekends in the county morgue and to work five hundred
hours at the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago. See John Lucadamo, Evanston Beating
Nets Probation:Assailant Must Spend Time in Morgue, Chi Trib C3 (Apr 7, 1992). See also
Charles Fishman, Autopsy Sentence Altered to Rescue-Squad Ride, Wash Post B3 (Mar 27,
1984) (A reckless driver, originally required to view autopsy, ordered instead to ride for
two nights with a rescue squad.); Lanie Jones, "Shock Treatment" for Drunk Drivers: Visit-
ing a Morgue, LA Times 1 (Aug 21, 1987) (reporting convicted drunk drivers ordered to
spend two hours at the county morgue and ten hours at a hospital trauma center); Two
Football Players Sentenced for Arson, UPI (Apr 19, 1985) (Two football players guilty of
arson ordered to "respond[ I] to the scenes of fires where a victim has died and then writ[e]
an essay about the experience.").
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service, because talionic restitution, unlike community service,
requires the offender to repair the particular kind of harm he has
caused, not simply to provide some general service to the commu-
nity26 7
Talionic restitution can misfire even worse if the restitution
bears no relationship whatsoever to the offense. For example,
Houston's Judge Poe ordered a man convicted of child abduction
to clean the stables of the Houston mounted police.2' While the
work may have been unpleasant, and even shameful, it was
hardly educative. A closer case comes from Baltimore, Maryland,
where Judge Edward Angeletti ordered a man convicted of selling
fake insurance policies to Maryland horse trainers to clean out
the stalls of the city's mounted police unity.2 9 The fit between the
crime and the punishment looks tighter, but it still seems more
poetic than educative. The same goes for the sanction imposed on
a man convicted of plucking feathers from two golden eagles, a
federal offense. He was required to work in a chicken processing
plant.27 Again, the punishment may have been talionic, but its
educational potential was dubious.
C. Apology Rituals
One popular form of creative punishment is the apology rit-
ual.271 Usually the offender is forced to make a public apology, in
which case the ritual is best seen as a shaming penalty, since the
See Barnett, 87 Ethics at 288-91 (cited in note 256).
'See Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, Humiliation Comes Back As Criminal Justice Tool,
Christian Sci Mon 1 (Dec 17, 1996). See also Gary Taylor, Batman Comics Thieves Get
Creative Punishment, Natl L J 43 (May 13, 1991) (One youth convicted of stealing comic
books required to do odd jobs in public library, and two others required to read books to
children at county hospital.); Judge's Penalties Offer Food For Thought and For the Poor,
Natl L J A24 (Oct 27, 1997) ("[NMonviolent, petty offenders" convicted of offenses such as
speeding and bad check writing required to pay fines in food that is distributed to the
poor.).
See Maryland Stable Duty, Wash Post at D5 (cited in note 20).
'See Around the Nation: Addenda, Wash Post A20 (Feb 2, 1996).
'1 See, for example, Jay Mathews, Freedom Means Having to Say You're Sorry; Crimi-
nal Justice System Tries an Apology Ad' Program as an Alternative to Prison, Wash Post
A3 (Nov 9, 1986) (describing "apology ad" program in Newport, Oregon); Jim Runnels,
Public Apology is Man's Sentence for Assaulting Police Officers, Orlando Sent 1 (June 7,
1990) (A man accused of assaulting police required to place an ad in the local paper apolo-
gizing for his behavior.); Russell, Good Housekeeping at 201 (cited in note 9) (A man con-
victed of spousal abuse required to "publicly apologize to [his wife] on the steps of city hall
at noon."). See also United States v Clark, 918 F2d 843, 848 (9th Cir 1990), overruled on
other grounds in United States v Kays, 95 F3d 874 (9th Cir 1996) (upholding published
public apology as a condition of probation and noting that "a public apology may serve a
rehabilitative purpose").
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emphasis is more on the shame of a public confession and less on
the meaning of the apology itself.
However, apology rituals can also play a role in the educating
model. From this perspective, the emphasis is on the apology and
not on the shame that might accompany giving it in public. In
fact, insofar as the shame of a public apology drowns out the
meaning and significance of the apology itself, the educating
model would urge the apology to be made in private, away from
public view. What lesson, though, do apology rituals teach? And
how do they fit within the educating model?
Apology rituals bear a noticeably different relationship to the
educating model than do talionic punishments. Under the moral
education theory, an apology and the desire to make amends
should be the result of punishment, at least when the punishment
"works," and not the punishment itself. Ideally, that is, the of-
fender learns through his punishment the wrongfulness of what
he has done and having realized its wrongfulness, voluntarily re-
pents. The upshot of this process may be an apology. Genuine
apologies produced in this fashion can have an almost magical
character. Apologies "constitute-in their most responsible,
authentic, and, hence, vulnerable expression-a form of self-
punishment that cuts deeply because we are obliged to retell, re-
live, and seek forgiveness for sorrowful events that have rendered
our claims to membership in a moral community suspect or de-
feasible."272
On this view, therefore, the coerced apologies at the center of
apology rituals are simply outside the ambit of the moral reform
theory. An apology must be the consequence of punishment and
the only good apology is a sincere apology.
But this way of looking at the value of an apology and the
scope of the moral reform theory is too narrow. While a sincere
apology is the ideal, we shouldn't underestimate the educational
value of a formal apology, whether or not we believe it to be sin-
cere. Parents routinely tell their misbehaving children to "say
you're sorry," without any real hope of sincerity. Why? Because
the exercise itself teaches a valuable lesson. The emphasis in
apology rituals can be as much on the ritual as on the apology.27
'Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation 8 (Stan-
ford 1991). See also Erving Goff-man, Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order
113-14 (Basic Books 1971) (discussing apologies).
'See Jeifrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean
Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy 14, 28 (Cambridge 1988) ("Sometimes ... [an] apology is
more than mere ritual .... At other times we will settle simply for the ritual-so long as it
is not transparently insincere.").
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When we violate a rule of social intercourse and have no excuse
or justification for our conduct, the proper response is to accept
responsibility for our actions and to try to make amends, if only
by making a simple apology. 4 Thus, if talionic punishments try
to teach the offender why his action was wrong in the hope that
he will voluntarily respond with an apology, apology rituals try to
teach him in a more direct fashion what the proper moral re-
sponse to wrongdoing is by forcing him to apologize.
Moreover, this approach to apology rituals suggests that ex-
isting rituals, which only require an apology from the offender,
are incomplete. Ideally, apologies are not one-sided affairs. On
the contrary, a "proper and successful apology is the middle term
in a moral syllogism that commences with a call [for apology] and
ends with forgiveness."75 Some crimes may be unforgivable, and
forgiving too readily may be more vice than virtue.276 Under the
right circumstances, however, the proper response to a sincere
apology is to accept it, and going one step further, to forgive. So if
we are more concerned with the educative function of "going
through the motions" than with sincerity, then perhaps offenders
should not be forced to issue an apology unless the victim is pre-
pared, however insincerely, to "accept" it.
In the moral economy of apology, the state acts as a teacher
both for offenders and victims. Apologizing and forgiving, like any
form of social and moral tuition, must be taught and learned.277
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Moreover, in Japan the sincerity of an apology is less a matter of the offender's inter-
nal state of mind, as it is in the United States, and "more a matter of performing the cor-
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Coerced apologies, together with coerced forgiveness, should be
looked upon as efforts to instruct, not so much about the wrong-
ness of the offense, but about the virtues of remorse, forgiveness,
and reconciliation. The offender is taught how he should respond
to his wrongdoing, while the victim is taught "how to be angry in
the service of forgiveness rather than vindictiveness."78
Like talionic punishments, apology rituals can, of course,
misfire. Beyond the acceptable risk that an apology will simply be
insincere is the unacceptable risk that an apology will take a
pathological form. An apology may, for example, degenerate into
"exhibitionism, self-pity, or... egocentric indulgence. 79 In this
case the apology, far from being an occasion for healing, becomes
an opportunity for the offender to inflict additional harm. It may
be for this reason that some courts order apologies to be made in
writing, rather than in person. Not only can written apologies be
approved by the court in advance, they also eliminate any risk
that the delivery and performance of the apology will serve as an
opportunity for yet more torment. On the downside, written
apologies also eliminate the kind of reconciliation that can only
come with a face-to-face encounter.
CONCLUSION
Creative punishments may not amount to anything more
than relatively rare objects of curiosity. To the extent they be-
come more than that, judges should realize that they come in two
very different forms-shaming and educating. Many, though not
all, of the creative punishments we see today fit the shaming
model better than they do the educating model, but the appeal of
shame is decidedly mixed. Judges looking for alternatives to in-
carceration and probation should therefore take a closer look at
the didactic alternative to shame.
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